Africa’s leadership bright spots, dark blots and fading stars (7)

TINY AND ISOLATED LIGHTS and cameras are insufficient to illuminate or view the continent of Africa in any meaningful attempt to highlight its challenges. But sadly, that is what is being done presently by leaders of African countries. On the contrary, countries outside Africa with profound interest in the continent have a barrage of information on the continent, well beyond what all the 54 countries, combined, have. It really appears like not many countries of Africa care for the affairs of others other than their own. And many countries are so small in population sizes and landmass such that they are unable to guarantee their own security. This was part of the reasons insecurity crept in, burgeoned and became intractable in many parts of Africa, particularly the Sahel. This growing spectre of insecurity is reshaping Africa’s foreign relations and diplomatic alignments in rather confounding ways. While it remains doubtful if any external help can bring hope and assurance to African countries experiencing various degrees of insecurity, many seem fixated on this line of reasoning, choosing rather to betray their sense of helplessness openly.

It is important to recognise at once that solutions to Africa’s insecurity problems can be found within Africa, if only the political leaders will be forthright, bold and patriotic enough. But it seems these three attributes are in short supply as leaders from various countries of Africa jostle for the attention of countries that come right into Africa for their own benefits primarily. It was rather interesting hearing an African leader standing in front of an East Asian audience to condemn democracy and its purveyors. All because of favour, recognition or what? It is important for African countries to understand the changing configuration of global diplomacy and carefully hedge their bets. It does no good for any country to suddenly jettison an old ally while embracing new untested ones. On the contrary, however, it is unwise to blindly get stuck with old allies that don’t bring mutual benefits to the  alliance table.

The cases of West African countries in the Sahel region is of interest, particularly the spread of insecurity. Mali in particular exemplifies the crisis in the region in a number of ways. While the failure of democratically elected civilian governments to curb insecurity has been used as an alibi for military takeover in Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso,  the insidious permeation of rogue security apparatus into those countries is worrisome. This rogue group may well take over the entire West and East Africa very soon. Justifiable as it may be considered for a sovereign nation, why would Mali choose to entrust the security of its citizens to the hands of a non-state quasi-private military outfit? What happens to the ECOWAS Military Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)? Instead of hasty and punitive ECOWAS sanctions and ostracism against Mali for military takeover, it appears that the other ECOWAS countries have limited and uncoordinated consensus on the security challenges. One fact that was missed in the ECOWAS sanctions was that national borders are generally porous, moreso in the Sahelian belt, which makes political isolation ineffectual. Why not activate and repackage the ECOMOG in response? And if that is not done, why blame Mali or the other countries for returning to military rule? And how do we expect Russia’s Wagner mercenaries, for instance, to handle the crisis in Mali better than sub-national forces? The G5 Sahel countries have been faltering since its inception nearly six years ago, principally based on inadequate funding, poorly trained and ill-equipped military. The Accra Initiative does not seem to be helping much either.

The time has come for African countries to build virile sub-regional and continental military forces. Leaving military intervention in the hands of outsiders is not fashionable any more than calling a stranger to watch over your  house. It is no longer feasible or desirable as this is difficult to separate from the foreign countries’ commercial interests. None of these foreign interventionists are doing anything for nothing. Years of France’s involvement in its former colonies have been a period of unrestrained exploitation. That is changing now as some leaders are speaking up against it. But that is not enough. They must fully and permanently wean themselves from these exploiters. It is clear, therefore, that the new set of foreign military outfits is not here for free.

Wagner could simply be a Russian proxy in Africa. The devastating impacts in countries where it has been operating call for caution. Recent reports have linked Wagner group to illicit business activities, including cross border smuggling in some countries, particularly in Central Africa. According to reports, “Wagner already has footholds in the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya and Sudan.” More worrisome, according to one of such reports, is that Wagner latches on existing fault lines and joins existing rogue groups in the areas of operation. It was observed that the Chadian rebel groups overlap with Wagner forces in the CAR and in Libya, where the rebels joined eastern General Khalifa Haftar’s attempt — aided by Wagner — to take full control of the divided country. No country in West Africa can afford to feign ignorance or pretend that this does not pose an existential threat to other countries even outside the ECOWAS sub-region.

Current events may soon prove wrong the decisions to get Wagner group involved in the continent. More worrisome now is the prospect of Wagner’s growing influence on countries’ home governments. The Sahelian countries, which  invited Wagner mercenaries, may soon have reasons to rue their earlier optimism on Wagner. Chad could be its next target as fears are already being exercised on Wagner’s likely attempt at overthrowing the country’s government in its ongoing attempt to expand across the Sahel.

Russia is gradually making inroads into Africa by proxy and may soon succeed in installing or removing governments. It is dangerous and presumptuous to play down the roles Russia is already playing on the continent of Africa. Based on insiders’ disclosures, Wagner reportedly trained the rebel fighters who killed former President Idriss Déby Itno and Wagner’s Yevgeny Prigozhin has been accused of providing Chadian rebel groups with the material and operational support to overthrow Chad’s government led by Mahamat Idriss Déby. Wagner’s eyes are on Chad’s rich natural resources, most notably oil, and other minerals in other Sahel countries. It could be inferred that, through Wagner, African countries are contributing to the funding support for Moscow in financing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In the CAR, mercenaries have been accused of killing or chasing out artisanal miners and smuggling gold worth millions of dollars in Sudan, while carrying out disinformation campaigns and manipulating their people. Central Africa is once more becoming unstable and fractious, with fears looming over possible overthrow of some governments. The involvement of Wagner with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan calls for concern as the alliance may further frustrate the country’s return to civilian democracy. The expanding spheres of influence of Russia in Africa is expected to whittle down democracy within the continent. The combination of Russian and Chinese influences will drive the continent further away from democracy and will pave the way for widespread installation of authoritarianism in its worst form, more extreme than those foisted on countries by despotic leaders. Collective efforts are needed for resolving the crisis that is already undermining Africa. Sub-regional communities, African Union and the United Nations need to pay more attention to this growing threat to national and regional security.

From a pure ideological standpoint, the call for an end to a unipolar world may sound good on the surface. In practice, it may hold some unpredictable prospects. While the multipolar system will truly provide Africa with many alternatives, it is getting clearer that the outcome is not as straightforward. If the best of alternatives we can get are Chinese debt diplomacy and Russia’s Wagner mercenaries, then Africa needs to rethink the multipolar system and make better informed choices.