Grim omen as ECOWAS loses Burkina, Mali, Niger

CULMINATION OF EVENTS since the nearly past four years in West Africa are now crystallising. The latest was the announcement made on Sunday in Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey in the joint statement to formally signify the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Whether or not ECOWAS was prepared for this withdrawal remains a conjecture as events since July 26, 2023 had clearly shown a cleavage and a shift in the direction of the three countries from within the ECOWAS in response to the reactions of the regional economic bloc. The reactions, involving isolation, ostracism, sanctions and blockade have been described as unfriendly by the three countries where the military leaders have clung fast to power since their successful takeover from the civilian regimes they toppled. The military leaders have found common grounds, thus forming an alliance to jointly pursue a number of actions, one of which is the common defence front against external aggression from state actors and non-state actors alike. The most recent is withdrawal of membership from the ECOWAS.

What the leaders at the forefront of the sanctions against Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger seem to have failed to realise is that many of them are anything but epitome of democracy as there is clear evidence of actions and policies that portray them as anti-democratic in practice. The obvious absence of good governance in many of those countries purportedly running democratic governments and the fact that they are not better off economically are an indictment on the countries kicking against those three countries now under military rule. Where Faure Gnassingbé, Alassane Ouattara, Macky Sall and Ahmed Tinubu are leading voices against the military juntas, the outcome is predictable. Their examples can only serve to embolden more military coups or other anti-democratic actions rather than stopping them.  Top on Gnassingbé’s credential as a president of Togo is that he is a product of dynastic rule, although he tries to give a semblance of democracy by conducting elections which he has always won since he took over power after his father’s death in 2005. Ouattara, who got a tenure extension through the backdoor in 2020, is currently serving his third term as president of Côte d’Ivoire. Senegal’s Sall was recently enmeshed in the allegations of trying to use state powers to stifle the political ambition of the opposition candidate Ousmane Sonko, a likely obstacle to Sall’s third term bid. Tinubu emerged as current Nigeria’s president in 2023 under controversial circumstances that defied moral and democratic principles.

ECOWAS leaders may have unwittingly paved the way for regional disunion and the future collapse of the regional economic community (REC) that was established in 1975. A lot could still happen before it clocks 50 years soon. The exit of the three countries will undoubtedly weaken the REC in a number of ways. The weak regional aviation market could be weakened further as a result of retaliatory measures from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.  The air blockade pronounced against Niger in the aftermath of the July 26 coup has set a very scary precedent, just as the immediate Niger-Nigeria border closure and initial threat of military overrun of Niger through the false heroism led by Nigeria’s president. The three countries have a number of political and economic aces they could draw on in any fight against regional aggressors. If Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger should choose to act in unison in retaliation against other ECOWAS countries, they could very easily prevent countries in the West Coast from flying over their airspace. Countries that such a decision will affect mostly are Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, all of which will have to circumvent the three countries if they must travel to Asia, Middle East, Europe, North Africa and North America. That will involve added costs of air travels for the affected countries.

Bilateral treaties could suffer serious setbacks between the three countries and the remaining ECOWAS member countries. Following the irrational decision to discountenance the subsisting pact on electricity between Niger and Nigeria by the latter’s action to abruptly cut power supply to the former, Niger, in retaliation, can decide to set aside the agreement not to dam River Niger upstream. Either or both Niger and Mali could now disregard Nigeria by installing a new dam, which may upend Nigeria’s hydroelectric power, the main source of electricity to Nigeria at present.  Collaboration involving other ECOWAS countries and the three isolated countries could be jeopardised. In particular, military cooperation in the fight against insecurity within the West African sub-region could also face serious impediment as the three countries could choose rather to be more inward-looking than widening their scope of interventions. These could involve intelligence and surveillance information sharing, financial contributions, military personnel contribution and military hardware support. In what might seem unlikely, the three landlocked countries may review their logistics arrangements with the coastal neighbours by switching their sea import arrangements towards more friendly countries on fresh bilateral arrangements.

No one should be in doubt about any likely covert arrangements with Guinea Conakry, a fourth country also currently under military rule, which has not hidden its sympathy for the other three. Its current quiescence now could be both tactical and strategic. The port of Conakry could take over maritime goods and logistics for Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in the event that they could no longer freely deal with Tema, Dakar, Abidjan and Cotonou because of the ECOWAS diplomatic standoff. Guinea Conakry could join the three countries anytime soon to strengthen the hold of the military in the four countries within West Africa in what may look like “the more the merrier.” The African Continental Free Trade Agreement for the continental free trade (AfCFTA) could experience serious hindrance due to possible lack of cooperation of the three countries with the rest of ECOWAS countries as the former would have lost the latter’s privileges, especially under the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS). Within the framework of the ETLS – a tool for achieving a free trade area within the ECOWAS – elements such as the rules of origins and some procedures are aimed at facilitating countries’ access to benefits from the ETLS trade instrument to encourage duty free trade among ECOWAS member states. ECOWAS trade volume and value may thus be diminished in return.

A stable Sahel region is a key priority for Europe. Within the framework of the EU Strategy for Africa, the G5 Sahel joint force was considered vital in counterterrorism, fighting armed groups linked to ISIL and Al Qaeda, combating transnational organised crime and trafficking in the Sahel, a region that has seen an increase in violence since 2017. After its creation in February 2014 in Nouakchott, Mauritania, at a summit of five Sahel countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, the G5 adopted a convention of establishment on 19 December 2014, and is permanently seated in Mauritania. The G5 provides an institutional framework to promote development and security within its five member countries. However, in May 2022, the military government of Mali announced its withdrawal from the G5 Sahel joint force over leadership positions, thus creating a setback for the group. It is unlikely if the G5 will be able to continue if Burkina Faso and Niger follow suit. What happens under the new dispensation could be a new G3 involving the three countries with stronger ties and a jettisoning of the old G5 instead.

Beyond West Africa, the decision of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger must have dealt a serious blow to the strategic interest and influence of France in the West African sub-region. Of the eight members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), also known by its French acronym, UEMOA, the exit of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger will likely diminish the combined strength of Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Togo in that union, particularly now that the three countries have openly challenged France and its influence on them and the continued use of the CFA as regional currency has been questioned recently, with reference to it as “colonial tax.” For nearly 80 years, the CFA has been in use in former French colonies of West and Central Africa as regional currency. Under the arrangement, countries using CFA Francs were required to store 50 to 85 percent of their currency reserves with the Banque de France. The currencies were pegged to the French France until the year 2000 when France, upon accession to the European Union, dropped its own Franc and adopted the Euro, thus tying WAEMU and CFA to the European Central Bank (ECB) by proxy.

In Abidjan, December 2019, a visiting President Macron of France – in collusion with Ivorian President Ouattara – attempted to hijack the ECO and swap the name for CFA. In essence, ECO – the ECOWAS currency that was proposed for launch in 2000, but has failed to come on stream after many times – would have been obliterated and replaced by CFA under the garb of ECO, but only for eight WAEMU countries.  According to Ouattara, “the name will change to Eco in 2020. France would not be governing the management of the common currency, and ultimately, Cote d’Ivoire and the seven other countries that use it would “stop holding 50 percent of the reserves in the French Treasury.” That dishonest approach, hailed by Macron as “heroic reform,” would have played well into France’s far-sighted long term plan of retaining its hold on economies of its former West African colonies under the guise of being an ECOWAS currency, whereas it is a European-tied currency. The failure of France to take over ECO by subterfuge and the increasing questioning of CFA by the former colonies may thus exacerbate the decline of France’s influence in West Africa and may ultimately lead to its loss of the entire West Africa even if it still has a grip on Central Africa for some time more; that is, assuming any other countries do not quickly follow Gabon in carrying out military takeover of government and renunciation of France’s influence. 

Even without a military coup, the event of March 2023 in which President Félix Tshisekedi called the bluff of visiting President Emmanuel Macron on the podium, telling the latter to address him as equal and not as inferior, remains telling. Meanwhile, President Roch Kabore of Burkina Faso had earlier walked out on Macron, also during Macron’s visit in Ouagadougou in November 2017, when the latter cracked a joke that Kabore considered unacceptable. These would not have happened some 30 years ago. An end to françafrique is clearly in the horizon.

Deepening tension within ECOWAS will not succeed in bringing the countries now ruled by the military under submission. It can only heighten tension and make them toe more hard line position. As their joint statement on Sunday indicated, these three countries said that they have “decided in complete sovereignty on the immediate withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),” contending that the REC has “moved away from the ideals of its founding fathers and pan-Africanism after nearly 50 years of its establishment.” They added that “ECOWAS, under the influence of foreign powers, betraying its founding principles, has become a threat to its member states and its populations whose happiness it is supposed to ensure.” With that announcement, the hope of bringing the three countries back to the ECOWAS fold may have further dimmed, especially as the three nations have formed a security alliance after severing military ties with France and other European nations and turning to Russia for support. Their accusation of ECOWAS was explicit, on failing to assist them in fighting “existential” threats like terrorism — the common reason cited for toppling their democratically elected governments. “When these states decided to take their destiny into their own hands,” they claimed, “it (ECOWAS) adopted an irrational and unacceptable posture in imposing illegal, illegitimate, inhumane and irresponsible sanctions in violation of its own texts.”

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