Grim omen as ECOWAS loses Burkina, Mali, Niger (4)

PENULTIMATE WEEKEND, the West African regional economic bloc, ECOWAS,  made a spirited attempt to draw the countries that earlier announced their voluntary exit back into the fold. That announcement came with carrots and candies: that all the sanctions imposed on the countries concerned were unconditionally and unilaterally lifted. The announcement, which was more of a panic and frantic response to the decision by Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to leave ECOWAS, was both an afterthought and a distress signal. Was it not the same ECOWAS that earlier responded to the exit decision rather offhandedly and in a manner that portrayed it as unmoved or unwavering on those three countries? To underscore the diplomatic blunders in the initial response by ECOWAS, it merely wrote a dismissive response signifying that it has not been formally informed about the planned exit. That was probably one of the areas in which ECOWAS further complicated the problem of confidence in its operational machinery. ECOWAS was probably uninformed about the fact that legalism does not always succeed in conflict resolution and can sometimes worsen the conflict, particularly one involving national sovereignty under threat.

As if to slap ECOWAS in the face or to dare it to do its worst, Mamady Doumbouya, the Guinean military leader announced at about that same period his regime’s intention to overhaul its cabinet. This is in contrast with what might have been expected at this time if Doumbouya actually took ECOWAS seriously. ECOWAS too has been cold on this. Rather than announce his calendar for a transition to civilian rule, Doumbouya simply tweaked his cabinet by removing some officials, replacing them and appointing a Prime Minister. These don’t seem like decisions coming with an immediate transition or one in a foreseeable future, particularly since no such indication was provided. And an ECOWAS that was just capitulating over its standoff against Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger might have thought it unwise in trying to call Guinea out in the present circumstance so as not to inflame the landscape and make more blunders or losing more grounds. Otherwise, why has ECOWAS been silent on Doumbouya’s latest decision? Could it be that ECOWAS has reasoned that any further confrontation with Guinea might further widen the existing gulf?

The picture appears wider than the regional bloc may have earlier contemplated. The ECOWAS may have unwittingly opened a crack that might be difficult, if not impossible, to mend or fill. It may have inadvertently given fillip to these countries resolve to move in unison and common determination to free themselves once and for all from the stranglehold of the colonists that still held on to their countries rather tenaciously for over half a century of independence. It may also have taken a flawed decision that presents it as a puppet of France for three major reasons. First is the romance of France with Côte d’Ivoire in which it connived at the electoral manipulation by Alassane Ouattara and felt comfortable with his civilian coup, leading to his emergence as president for the third term in 2020. Why should the military leaders trust Côte d’Ivoire’s leader that got back into power through means similar to theirs? And why should they be comfortable with France applying double standards in dealing with Côte d’Ivoire on one hand and the other three countries under military rule on the other hand? Since ECOWAS had initially played France’s card during the standoff against Niger immediately after last year’s July 26 coup, how would the three countries with common political circumstances trust that regional bloc to mediate in any conflict without acting on behalf of the colonists? Thirdly, and rather indicting, the three countries, seeing such an unusual opportunity to affirm their readiness to cut off the umbilical cord connecting them to France, would be wondering why ECOWAS could not help or lead the way in getting these countries freed or truly becoming independent in the real sense of the word. And, now that they have the opportunity, they are very likely to be unwilling to throw it away. Meanwhile, a debate has got underway on the decision of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to ditch the colonial-era legacy, the CFA regional currency, that bound the West African francophone countries as these three countries are forging a new path politically and economically. The fact that ECOWAS has failed to get the “ECO” up and running since 2000 is enough a reason why these countries are very unlikely to trust ECOWAS in their plights, going forward.

It could be inferred, although not with 100 percent certitude, that France has a strong leverage over ECOWAS, a suspicion that could have been part of why those three countries might not be comfortable with any rapprochement, especially in the present circumstance. Although the three troubled Sahel states may be grappling with increased national security challenges since they have shown French soldiers the door, their immediate alternative — namely Russia — may have been significantly helpful in covering the gap and may be promising to do more in the future. The trip made by Mali and Burkina Faso leaders to Russia last year could be a pointer in that direction. This may come with an added shift in ideological leaning, as it may also provide fertile ground for Russia’s raw materials import from West Africa as well as a diplomatic battleground. As diplomatic fissures within the ECOWAS widen,  the ostracised countries have begun some bold initiatives. In September, they formed a military alliance called the Association of Sahel States (AES). Their withdrawal from the ECOWAS for “illegal, illegitimate, inhumane and irresponsible sanctions” imposed by the regional bloc was already causing unease in ECOWAS which, presumably, led it to revoke the sanctions it earlier imposed. Now, the common currency is another front in the ever widening conflict. “More changes might still surprise you. And it’s not just about currency. We will break all ties that keep us in slavery,” the Burkinabe military leader, Captain Ibrahim Traore of the transitional government reportedly said last month. Abdourahmane Tchiani, Niger’s military leader, recently corroborated this, saying that “currency is a sign of sovereignty” and that the “AES member states are engaged in the process of recovering their full sovereignty. It is no longer acceptable for our states to be France’s cash cow.” The manner in which Tchiani sent France’s ambassador out of Niger and the shoddy manner in which France handled the standoff should alert observers to a situation in which the will, rather than economic strength, was more involved. And, according to an old saying, “where there is a will, there is a way.” With these, it is clear that the battle line has been drawn, and they are unlikely to beat a retreat.

In Burkina Faso, for instance, Captain Ibrahim Traore has taken some landmark decisions that could be described as obviously defining and a watershed. From his latest official policy, the processing of all the gold mined in Burkina Faso will henceforth be done right there. The practice hitherto was to send the raw unprocessed gold to Europe for processing. The number one nation that was benefitting from this monopoly was France. Traore has also cancelled multiple secret agreements with France. Over the years, France was allowed to “store” or automatically confiscate the financial reserves of Burkina Faso. Traore has cancelled that. France was hitherto supposed to be the first country of preference for Burkina Faso’s exports. The country could only resort to any other importing country if France thought it had no need for that commodity. France had the exclusive rights to train the military for Burkina Faso. That is now cancelled. France had the right to send military troops to Burkina Faso if they determined that France’s interest needed to be protected there. He has cancelled that. Burkina Faso has been sending annual reports to France which had been remotely supervising their economy. He has cancelled that.

If indeed ECOWAS as a regional bloc and the African Union (AU) as a continental body are living up to their bidding, the three military leaders need support for the groundbreaking decisions they are taking, which are potentially capable of freeing them from the vice grip of foreign exploiters. That is if those leading at those levels really understand the underpinnings or have the will power to lead the way as these military leaders take up the challenges that have been avoided by most leaders in Africa, particularly since independence. Elsewhere in Africa, some contemporary leaders have braved the odds by making some radically disruptive policies. In 2017, Tanzania’s President John Magufuli threatened to shut all gold mines in the country if mining companies delayed talks to resolve a dispute over billions of dollars in back taxes the government said they owed. The same year, Magufuli imposed a ban on exporting unprocessed mineral ores. In 2021, President Félix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) announced that some mining contracts could be reviewed because of concerns they are not sufficiently benefiting Congo, the world’s largest producer of cobalt and Africa’s leading miner of copper. His government hinted at a planned review of a controversial mining deal signed between DR Congo and China 16 years earlier. This year, on January 29, officials said the contract had been amended to provide specific obligations to Chinese mining firms, including improving local infrastructure for the Congolese.

Within West Africa, and under the present circumstances of the countries under military rule, the idea of democracy may not be what is most needed. Rather, countries need to have firm control over their resources. The AES territories will have to act fast and smart on how to maintain control over the convertibility of any new currency they choose to float as well as ensuring harmonious monetary policy. If ECOWAS ignores all these and still thinks of getting Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger back, it may be more of a daydream and an indirect way of proving naivety in global North-South dichotomy and politics. The insidious hazard lurking behind the call for a return may not have been noticed by the ECOWAS leaders but has been sensed by the military leaders. Clearly, their unease could be associated with the current leadership of ECOWAS in which the chairman and Nigerian president, Bola Tinubu, is known to frequently travel to France on “private visit” that could be nothing but a veneer or a façade for some diplomatic chess game beyond the continent. Of the three countries, Niger is likely to be the most uncomfortable with Nigeria based on the ruptured diplomatic relations between the two countries in the aftermath of the hasty decisions against Niger that turned out to be all blunders. Those three countries would undoubtedly monitor Tinubu’s trips to Paris with a lot of misgivings as France’s lackey, puppet or stooge. Occupying the position of ECOWAS chairman will likely be considered an added trust baggage, a major reason why the three countries might be more unwilling to accept the call to return to ECOWAS. Moreover, as military leaders, their training in war tactics, deployed on diplomatic relations turf, could make them more reluctant to engage with ECOWAS as the invitation could be a bait, which could be insidiously used to draw them in and give them knocks after taking the bait. Since membership of regional associations — like any other association — is expected to be voluntary, the exit of the three countries from ECOWAS could be permanent and a fait accompli. Overall, the decline and eventual collapse of ECOWAS could be imminent.