EMOTIONS RUNNING HIGH in official quarters in the last couple of days in December in Nigeria reveal many diplomatic crisis that could potentially become a time bomb. If the handlers of official policies of the government are not more concerned about shutting down accusations than looking at undercurrents, their reactions ought to have been different. The absence of corroborating evidence of security threat is sometimes not proof of absence of such a threat. The military ruler of northern neighbouring Niger Republic, Abdourahmanne Tchiani, had accused the Nigerian government of colluding with France in a plan to destabilise Niger. But in a swift flurry of reactions, various officials, including Nuhu Ribadu, the National Security Adviser, not only denied the accusations, they tried to present Tchiani as a rabble rouser, crying wolf where none existed. Rather than succumbing to what the Nigerian government presented as blackmail, Tchiani and his government doubled down on their claims, insisting that France was up to some mischief against Niger and was hell bent on using Nigeria. Now, this is worth the attention for a number of reasons.
First is the ECOWAS crisis involving the loss of three members. The exit of the three is due to take effect this January, although ECOWAS is leaving a window of six months for Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to reconsider their decision to pull out of ECOWAS and return to the fold. That opening seems unattractive, unappealing and may ultimately slam shut as they have formed a parallel confederation, called the Alliance of Sahel States (ASS) or Alliance des États du Sahel (AES in French), effectively switching affinity away from the 15-member regional body and now forging a new alliance with common interests, common problems and common prospects.
Second reason is that a hardline approach by Nigeria against Niger will turn a rotten situation to a bad one, if not worse in terms of transborder diplomatic relationship. It could have multiplier effects, spreading across the AES and beyond in sympathy with Niger. This could negatively affect Nigeria’s progress and prospects in the territorial fights against the armed bandits and islamist insurgents. Let’s figure out Niger slapping an air embargo against Nigeria’s aviation industry, banning aircraft to and from Nigeria from using Niger’s airspace. Or, let’s imagine a scenario in which Niger or Mali decides to dam River Niger upstream and the impacts on electricity supply in Nigeria, as well as consequential impacts on industry, homes and offices. In a desperate situation, it is more likely that Niger will embark on drastic measures that could affect Nigeria negatively and to such a magnitude not anticipated by Nigeria.
Dealing hard and tough with Niger is a diplomatic hot potato as things stand now, especially considering the timing. The wider prospects of an intact ECOWAS could be further dimmed should Nigeria choose to go tough or hard after Niger. It could trigger a crisis that could spell the end of ECOWAS as the chair currently resides with Nigeria. To hear that the country currently chairing the regional bloc is instrumental to its internal crisis or eventual breakup will be bad news. For the sake of Africa’s emancipation, regional cohesion needs to be considered a priority and should shape each country’s diplomatic relations with their neighbours. Looking forward, the growing discontent within francophone countries and their longing for emancipation should be of interest to Nigeria as the largest of all the countries, not only in West Africa, but also in the whole of Africa. It will be wrongheaded to prioritise diplomatic relationships with countries outside Africa over those of countries we directly share borders with, especially when security issues are involved. If anything, the contiguous countries need to operate on common grounds of mutual trust, understanding and collaboration rather than on confrontation.Â
France’s diminishing influence in Francophone Africa has to be put in context. The imminent death of françafrique should awaken the anglophones of an emerging diplomatic reset. Rwanda began its own after the 1994 genocide in which France was accused of taking sides in the Hutu-Tutsi animosities and killings. The country turned anglophile, switching its diplomatic alliance to the UK and the US. Rwanda has not only become a member of the Commonwealth countries, it hosted the 26th Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in June 2022 in Kigali. Many other francophone countries appear set to follow. Lately, DR Congo — openly showing its disgust towards France — has embarked on a public showdown with President Emmanuel Macron. Between March 2023 and November 2024, Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi has twice upbraided President Macron. Reacting to France’s role in the lingering war in the Eastern DR Congo, in which Rwanda was accused of meddling, Tshisekedi openly snubbed Macron’s invitation to a meeting during his visit to attend a francophone countries’ conference.
It is important for Nigeria to read the signs on the wall very well and respond appropriately as these francophone countries try to free themselves from France, and end the quasi-independence of nearly 70 years. In the two blocs of francophone countries — namely the West and Central Africa — the remote influence of France on two main countries that are significant as gateways is instructive. Cameroon is to CEMAC Central Africa what Côte d’Ivoire is to its WAEMU West Africa equivalent. And, available evidence shows that France strategically holds those two countries tightly by meddling in the leadership affairs of the two countries. If France truly believes its former colonies should practice true democracy, it would not have tacitly supported the third term ambition of Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire who — according to unconfirmed rumours — is planning for a fourth term. It would not have been comfortable with Paul Biya’s continued stay in office for 42 years, even as he approaches 92 years of age on February 13. It would have openly opposed the idea of a president without a vice president portfolio in his cabinet.
If France were not complicit it would not have been silent on a number of dynastic rulers masquerading as running civilian regimes in its former colonies. It would have avoided shielding the Bongos of Gabon as power got transferred from the father, Omar, to the son after the death of the former in 2009. Since then, Ali had been running a semblance of democracy with which France had no problem, apparently. In the course of time, the ailing Ali — that Bongo junior — was still seeking reelection into office in elections that only he stood the chance of winning despite his obvious physical predicament of infirmities. He clung to power until August 2023 when he was ousted by the military.
In Togo, does France have any problem with Faure Gnassingbé who has been in power since 2005 after his father died? Apparently, no. And, France seems to have no qualms about supporting Mahamat, the son of Chad’s immediate past leader, Idriss Déby Itno, especially with the speed with which Macron moved to befriend him as soon as he was named his father’s successor in office. What consistent evidence of inconsistency in the commitment of France towards democracy and self rule in Africa! It has been surmised that France was aware of Déby’s imminent death and probably knew something about the armed bandits’ scheme that killed him in 2021. It is thus naive to think France could not have known some things about armed banditry in the other Sahel countries in general and the reportedly controversial insecurity allegations that Niger currently alleges against some groups in northern Nigeria.
The Ambazonia civil war in Cameroon’s Anglophone Southwestern region has been raging since 2016. Separatists in that region want their own state, called Ambazonia. That crisis seems like one with no end in sight as the international community has been reluctant to engage in and mediate the conflict since the beginning of the crisis. The face-off between the armed separatists and government forces has claimed more than 6,000 lives and displaced thousands of others. The crisis seems like a boiling over of what has been years of political undercurrents beneath the geopolitical structure of Cameroon, a country split unequally as 80 percent French speaking and 20 percent English speaking, wherein the French-run Cameroon becomes dominant and the English speaking Cameroon seems endangered. With France as a strategic partner for Cameroon, and by extension, the remote influencer of government and governance, the correctness of a guess about what has held the country’s development down won’t be far-fetched.
The Central African Republic is a mineral-rich country, but also an unstable one. Armed crisis has characterised the country for a while as illegal mining has been going on unchecked. Transborder armed violence is a recurring decimal. Burundi has not recovered from the internal crisis and bitter hostilities that assumed the tribal dimensions. Despite its riches in natural resources, it remains one of the poorest countries in Africa and in the Central African region. The Eastern DR Congo remains embroiled in hostilities involving killings, abductions, disappearances and displacements. This is not looking good for four contiguous countries of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and DR Congo as it not only threatens regional security, but also creates and sustains diplomatic tensions. The multiplicity of armed groups in that region has put a brake on development within the affected areas. With all of these happening, what other evidence is needed to pinpoint the direct and remote impacts of France involvement in those places where it has undisputed influence? And, for how long will African countries in the shadows of France have to endure the crises that have come to define the presence of France in their affairs. These call for urgent attention.
