Niger’s coup and the looming twilight of françafrique in Africa

DIPLOMATIC SHUTTLES BY Emmanuel Macron since he became the president of France in 2017 to countries with historical ties must have taught him some great lessons of real differences between suppositions, assumptions and realities. Apart from the various French outposts in the Caribbean, Latin America and the Oceania where the countries under France’s sphere of influence are much less and are smaller in population sizes, African former French colonies have been showing conspicuously very recently that time was up for France. In particular, many francophone African countries are now making known such dispositions, covertly and overtly. One event after another is pointing to a declining influence of France within Africa.

Paul Kagame, Rwanda’s dictator, made it a national policy to ditch the use of French as a national language, replacing it with English as he led Rwanda towards Britain and the US. He demolished the French cultural centre in Kigali and joined the Commonwealth, the group linking the UK with most of its former colonies. As an unequivocal testimony to this diplomatic relations shift, Rwanda hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Rwanda in 2022. An integral and prominent part of France’s relations with its former colonies is the French language, serving as a potent bonding instrument between the former and the latter. The removal of this in the diplomatic matrix is clearly indicative of a waning regional relevance and a declining influence. Earlier in June this year in Mali, a referendum was held, the  outcome of which showed, among others, that Mali was dropping French as an official language, thus downgrading it to just a working language.

The age-long exploitative policies on Africa by France are not only being challenged nowadays, the very idea of colonialism in nuanced forms has come under heavy attacks. In 2019, President Patrice Talon of Benin Republic reportedly called for an end to the CFA franc, calling it a “French Colonial Tax,” a misleading heuristic for understanding Françafrique. The outcome of former Guinean President, Sékou Touré’s referendum on whether or not to join the proposed Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) monetary union in 1958 was said to have drawn the ire of Charles de Gaulle who vindictively instructed the departing civil servants and professionals to sabotage everything they left behind while he was pulling them out of Guinea after an overwhelmingly “no” vote. This was just one of the many unpleasant cases of high-handedness in the history of France’s relationship with its former colonial territories.

The French-backed CFA Francs are used by eight West African countries and six Central African countries. Such countries are required to store a minimum of 50 percent of their currency reserves — pegged to the Euro — with the Banque de France. While some bought the idea that it shielded their countries from inflation experienced by single countries that issue their own currencies and still preferred to keep the status quo, many others considered it as a neocolonial tax that slows down economic growth and an insult to the sovereignty of those 14 poor countries held hostage and bullied into using the CFA. And so, President Talon has become the most vocal West African leader to have openly voiced out the discontent, announcing the plan by all eight-member countries of the West African CFA union to pull out of it, presumably heralding an end to a perceived parasitic, neocolonial relationship.

Since becoming president, Emmanuel Macron has been embarking on a series of visits to and meetings with leaders of many historically colonial francophone African countries. Although his diplomatic language and tone sound more subdued than those of his predecessors, not many African leaders seem impressed. They appear poised to assert themselves, particularly since it has become clear that francophone former French African colonies have historically been subsidising France’s economy — a situation that they would like to end as quickly as possible. Macron must have observed consistent reactions to him by contemporary African presidents who assert themselves as co-equal with him in status and openly detest any semblance of superior posturing by Macron. In 2017,

President Macron had it tough in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, after his speech was considered as sounding humiliating. Apart from being heckled by students who always resent any French president for their colonial past, his host, President Roch Marc Kabore, had to walk out of the room while both were on stage. His jokes on President Kabore apparently struck the wrong cord, even as he made attempts to assure the students that he is different, saying “I am from a generation that doesn’t come to tell Africans what to do.” If the statements considered upsetting, disrespectful and displeasing to President Kabore were uttered out of inexperience as he was still about six months in office when he visited Kabore, the same cannot be said of his encounter in Algiers.

In 2022, Macron faced what would further confirm the sliding profile of France in the eyes of former colonies as he experienced in Algiers from the voices that hurled insults at him during an official visit. Such reactions are a response to bitter experiences of people who are irked by the egregious mistakes and atrocities meted out by French authorities in the name of interventions in their countries, particularly in Tunisia and Libya. Violent protests across the Sahel provide an insight on the resentment felt by those who verbally abuse Macron despite his spirited efforts to convince them that he was different. Apart from common men, Macron has been tackled by a president. In an encounter with the DR Congo’s President Félix Tshisekedi during a joint press conference in Kinshasa, earlier in March 2023, President Tshisekedi told Macron to respect Africans. In a tense moment between both of them, he said: “Look at us differently by respecting us, by considering us as true partners and not always with a paternalistic look with the idea of always knowing what is necessary for us. Francafrique no longer exists. We must establish a policy of equals.” As if for emphasis, Tshisekedi stated that France and the West should abandon their imperious attitude towards Africa.

Although Macron may have been truly convinced initially that France is now living on borrowed time in Africa, some vested interests back home may not have been so convinced or are unprepared to accept reality and would rather contrive every idea possible to keep engaging Africa for continued unilateral benefits. Their gimmicks, which involve persuading French government to establish and operate public institutions, media organisations, security umbrellas, ideological networks and possibly embark on timely “interventions”, through questionable elections or coups — though no longer fashionable — might still be on the table as these “advisors” and policy influencers work closely with powerful French business entities that had eyed or are eyeing business prospects in strategic industries, particularly in mineral resources extraction, as in Niger. And therein lies the major problem in the France-Africa relations. Failure to recognise that the idea of françafrique has outlived its usefulness for France, and so it is now worn-out, will keep France making more costly mistakes in its dealings with Africa. Meanwhile, the past dealings have created a basis for mistrust and resistance against France as the cases of foreign-policy flaws in Libya, and a terrible miscalculation in Tunisia. In the francophone countries, France today is no longer at the commanding heights. In West Africa, especially, the real powers to watch now are China, Russia, US, Italy, Turkey and multiple Arab states, which are emboldening local actors and making them no longer solely rely on French networks or support to maintain power.

In the words of Hafed Al-Ghwell, a senior fellow and executive director at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC., “the failure to rein in jihadist insurgency groups and violent gangs is also fueling French resentment, since military rulers backed by Paris lack the competence, resolve or strategy to combat this threat. As a result, French antipathy has grown to a point where Sahelian communities would sooner tolerate lawless marauders than endure a sustained French presence that has lost all utility and relevance.” The perception that France is ensuring national or regional political and economic stability is therefore fast losing steam. The so-called “Françafrique,” used for cajoling former French colonies into believing their bonds were mutually beneficial, is running out of fashion, especially as the French influence over its former colonies is now seriously questioned as observable in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger after the military takeovers wherein jubilant crowds waved Russia’s flag, chanting “la bas à France,” meaning “down with France.”

Macron’s attempt to reset French ties to Africa has clearly hit trouble. What is happening now is obviously not the same as what he initially tried to achieve. In fact, there seems to be a conflict between what he said initially when he came into office newly and the current unfolding events. For instance, in that same 2017 speech at the University of Ouagadougou, Macron tried to impress his audience by declaring the end of “Françafrique,” which — in reality — is the French strategy of exerting military, political and commercial influence over its former colonies in Africa. In trying to convince the listeners, Macron said: “I haven’t come here to tell you what France’s Africa policy is, as others have done, because France no longer has an Africa policy!” That statement sounded suspect.

But the fence mending visit to Paul Kagame in Kigali in 2021, the Operation Barkhane military intervention in the Sahel and the politics of several resource-rich former colonial territories such as Guinea and Mali would prove contradictory to his earlier statement. The security and political challenges in the Sahel and the wave of coups d’état discredited his earlier populist posturing on his proclaimed ‘Françafrique’ strategy. Macron’s seeming connivance at the third term manipulation and rewriting of the constitution of Côte d’Ivoire by Alassane Ouattara was one out of his many diplomatic faux pas relating to françafrique. Mr. Macron was accused of meddling in politics ahead of the election in which Ouattara sought and obtained a controversial and constitutionally dubious third term. Ouattara remained a French ally, notwithstanding his institutional coup that brought him back into office.

What Mr. Macron wanted to present as a change of direction has not been convincing, especially considering the re-emergence of Mr. Ouattara and the seeming tacit support for President Macky Sall of Senegal who is currently persecuting his frontline political opponent, Ousmane Sonko, that has the greatest chances of winning the 2024 general elections, even as suspicion is rife that Mr. Sall — who is seen as France’s reliable ally — is likely to change the constitution and run for a third term. Mr. Sall and Mr. Ouattara have been described as “France’s errand boys.”

In the francophone countries in the Sahel, the rise in resentment against France today is a huge burden because of the security issue in the region. Criticisms of Macron’s Africa policy are also coming from within France. The Financial Times quoted one François Gaulme of Ifri, the French Institute of International Relations, as saying that Mr. Macron’s decision to send hundreds more troops to shore up Operation Barkhane underlines what he sees as a dangerous shift in Françafrique’s emphasis from the business to the military sphere. According to Gaulme, “France is very good at sending troops to Africa, but not at sending investors.” Reference to the deposed President Mohamed Bazoum of Niger as French and Western ally could thus be construed in the context of doing the bidding of France. In that case, the coup leaders — as said in their pronouncement — would be all too glad to remove him as a prelude to erasing France’s footprints in Niger as part of the process of ending françafrique, a form of relationship in which the benefits have been skewed more in favour of France and at the expense of Niger. Could this explain more elaborately why France is actively opposed to the coup rather than feigning helplessness and allowing it to just slide? The hypocrisy of françafrique has only just got more obvious. This looks more like the bottom line, rather than a genuine interest in preserving democracy in Niger.