September tragedies of Africa’s dams collapsing

DAMS IN AFRICA are becoming time bombs, waiting to explode. The risk they pose can be enormous, particularly in the form of outcomes of infrequent weather events. Tragedies involving dams collapse in the past one year in response to such weather events have claimed lives, displaced people, inundated houses, killed animals, devastated crops, destroyed infrastructure and created untold humanitarian disasters. The September 11, 2023 dam disaster in Libya was unprecedented for the North African country as two dams collapsed, displacing 40,000 people and killing another 4,000 in Derna and its suburbs in the Northeastern Libya region.

The Derna dam disaster did not happen without a warning. The collapse of the dams gave some forebodings which were obviously either ignored or explained away until it became a reality. 

Triggered by extreme rainfall from the hurricane-strength Storm Daniel, the 2023 disaster saw two dams burst in Derna. The tragedy therefore exposed Libya’s divided leadership, corruption, incompetence, splintered governance structure and crumbling infrastructure. The Libyan situation deteriorated while a war of attrition has led to the wasting away of lives and property as the government ignored the impending dangers while the country was torn in between the two powerful factions fighting for the control of the heart of the country. 

In the process, they ignored or probably were ignorant of the fact that dams are a reality of our times, requiring constant monitoring, particularly as the world becomes increasingly urbanised. In addition to urban water supplies, dams are expected to be sources of electricity generation. Their collapse was therefore costly for the nation as catastrophic failures of two dams in Derna had been. The devastating floods in eastern Libya, under the control and influence of the military strongman, Khalifa Haftar, were avoidable. 

Aside from how the dam is constructed, there should be safety provisions in place. The storm resistance ability and the maximum carrying capacity of the dam must have been exceeded, while the release of water to ensure the dams’ breaking limit was not exceeded must have been omitted. Some reports alleged that, in the Libyan case, the management of the dams was not good. It was also alleged that when the engineer responsible for the dam noticed that a huge volume of water was entering the reservoir, he should have released large quantities of water to keep its level lower than the upper limit. It was also of essence to be aware of possible high impact infrequent, climate-induced natural disasters generally, and brace for them. In Libya’s case, bad management was fingered as the cause of the dams’ collapse.

Whether the Libyan officials could have avoided that tragedy was an extremely relevant question. To ignore heavy rainfall and the disasters that occurred was suicidal. Libya was mired in chaos and corruption. The warnings that the Derna dams may burst went unheeded for years until the disaster struck. 

A site for a dam will not always be level because dams are built in mountainous areas, but the designers must take that into consideration. The dam design must suit the topography, a report has stated. Many factors can cause dam failures, but the rarer causes, by percentage, are three percent for acts of war, two percent for defective materials and one percent for earthquakes. Dam managers are expected to know each dam’s catchment area and how much rainfall is forecast: but it requires coordination between meteorologists and the staff responsible for the management of dams. 

Experts had long warned that floods posed a significant danger to two dams meant to protect nearly 90,000 people in the northeast of Libya. They thus repeatedly called for immediate maintenance of these two structures, located just uphill from the coastal city of Derna. But successive governments in the chaos-stricken North African nation reportedly did not react.

“In the event of a big flood, the consequences will be disastrous for the residents of the valley and the city,” noted Abdelwanees Ashoor, a professor of civil engineering, who wrote in a study published in the Sabha University Journal of Pure and Applied Sciences, a year earlier. According to the professor, “in the event of a big flood, the consequences will be disastrous for the residents of the valley and the city.” The warnings became a reality last year, on September 11 as flood waters overran Derna after the two dams broke, succumbing to the force of water coming from behind. It is sheer naivety to assume that dams will remain dependable and safe without maintenance year after year.

In Nigeria’s northeast, on September 10, 2024, the Alau Dam collapsed, causing severe flooding and displacements in Borno State. Before then, the dam gave warnings which were either ignored or acted upon rather tardily until the disaster occurred. It was clear from reports that the dam did not lack funds for continual maintenance activities. Rather, what was lacking was the will to do the right things. Within the previous four years, a sum of ₦400m had been budgeted. Whether or not it was used, and what it was used for are the unknown facts. The breakdown of the budgetary allocation shows that ₦285,096,278 was allocated for the rehabilitation of the dam in 2020. In 2021, it was ₦80 million. Following the Maiduguri flooding, the African Blue Community of the Ecumenical Water Network Africa (EWNA) condemned the neglect and fund mismanagement that aided the dam collapse.

Following heavy rains between August and September 2024, a massive flood devastated various communities, particularly Maiduguri, due to the collapse of Alau dam in the neighbouring Konduga local government area of Borno State. 

This marked the first time the Alau Dam has overflowed massively since 2012. This time, it has displaced over 414,000 residents across Maiduguri and parts of Jere local government. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) has stated that nearly half of Maiduguri was buried in the flood water. Alau Dam, considered as a critical infrastructure – constructed between 1984–1986 to regulate water flow and provide irrigation and drinking water in Maiduguri and environs – impounds a major reservoir on the Ngadda River, one of the tributaries of Lake Chad.

There had been reports of pockets of smaller scale flooding from the dam in the past; in 1992, the dam reached its maximum shortage level and spilled over, causing flooding in Jere Bowl. In 1994, a flash flood from the Yedzeram River caused extensive flooding in Maiduguri. In 2012, torrential rainfall caused the Alau Dam to open its evacuation valve, releasing a massive amount of water that caused flooding in Maiduguri and surrounding areas. However, the 2024 flooding had such a magnitude that displaced people, destroyed infrastructure and killed more than 80 percent of animals in the Sanda Kyarimi Park Zoo.

The Alau Dam collapse was thought inevitable as warning signs were allegedly ignored; early warnings of experts in and around the region. Cracks were reportedly seen in the dam’s walls and erosion had taken over the embankments, resulting from years of abandonment that weakened its structure.

Investigations from external bodies reportedly alleged the state government’s negligence and mismanagement of funds by officials of concerned ministries, affecting infrastructure, like in many projects across Nigeria with little to no accountability leading to a systemic rot.

From a public portal dedicated to tracking the federal government’s spending, Govspend, more than ₦309 million were disbursed for rehabilitating the Alau dam between 2018 and 2024, released in 13 tranches by the Chad Basin River Development Authority (CBDA) to different companies. “In 2020, one of the companies, Dalori Construction Nigeria Ltd, received ₦51.7 million in three months — ₦13.6 million in March, ₦12.3 million in April and ₦25.8 million in June while S.M Gudunbali Nigeria Ltd, another company, was paid ₦8 million in 2018 and N7.6 million the following year. “Similarly, Balmari Investment Nigeria Ltd was paid ₦14.6 million in 2022 and ₦21.4 million a year before. On November 12, 2022, Auno Engineering and Construction Services Ltd, was paid ₦17 million for rehabilitation works on the dam. In June 2023, Kukabam General Merchant Niger Ltd was paid ₦23.4 million for the same purpose. On September 20, 2023, the agency disbursed more than ₦16.2 million to Federal Inland Revenue for “VAT in respect of Hammal and Partners Ltd for the final payment on Alau dam,” it said.

EWNA has called for a comprehensive investigation into allegations of neglect and mismanagement of funds that led to the tragedy as well as a comprehensive flood disaster assessment in collaboration with relevant development partners to get clear and reliable data to assess the real extent of damage and chart ways to avoid future occurrence and help for victims.

The neglect of such a critical infrastructure enabled the tragedy to compound the suffering of communities already ravaged by the Boko Haram insurgency, highlighting the urgent need for accountability and reform in Nigeria’s governance. However, the dam’s history is marred by disaster. In 1994, it collapsed, causing widespread flooding that displaced approximately 400,000 people in Maiduguri and affected six other northern states.

The Forum for Investigative Journalism (FIJ) displayed scanned details of fund allocations to the failed dam project. Under various administrations — from Goodluck Jonathan to Muhammadu Buhari and now Bola Ahmed Tinubu — the highest allocations of funds for different rehabilitation exercises were made under Buhari’s government with ₦285 million in 2020 and ₦200 million in 2023. The 2012, 2013 and 2016 budgets specifically described the repairs that the Federal Government was appropriating for. In 2012, for instance, ₦11 million was allocated for a desilting exercise and a hydrographical survey on the dam. Another ₦12 million went to the reservoir desilting in 2013. More allocations followed, including ₦10 million in 2016 to rehabilitate dyke 1, 2 and 3 in the dam. But since 2017, the government consistently allocated money for ongoing rehabilitation with only vague descriptions that read “Alau Dam Rehabilitation” in the budgets for those fiscal years.

Per the drafting of the budget, the Federal Ministry of Water Resources is responsible for executing these projects and the Chad Basin River Development Authority, under this ministry, serves as the implementing agency. Over the years, however, it has been unclear if the allocations to the dam were disbursed to the implementing agency or effectively used. For instance, the 2012 budget implementation report noted a 70.59 percent performance rate but did not specify if the funds were disbursed for the dam’s survey and desilting or otherwise. The 2013 report paints a similarly unclear picture.

Despite the federal government’s claim that it prioritised water resources, the ministry reportedly implemented only 37.38 percent of its budget. As for 2014, the third and fourth quarter budget implementation reports were missing on the Budget Office’s website, making it impossible to assess if the implementing agency got the dam rehabilitation funds or not. Nevertheless, government expenditure records documented on the Open Treasury Portal confirm that approximately N300 million was spent on dam rehabilitation between 2018 and 2024. The largest chunk of this sum was spent in 2023, with the Chad River Basin Development Authority disbursing about N162 million to different contractors for repairs.

Despite getting ₦7.3 billion Ecological Fund, 12 states with Flood Hotspots reportedly used only ₦3.6 billion for environmental projects.

However, the United Nations has described the recent flood as even worse than the 1994 disaster. In August, FIJ reported how Borno got over ₦816 million in ecological funds from the Federal Government but spent about ₦770 on environmental protection in the past year. Yet the state’s response to flooding has mostly been reactive with palliative packages and improvised shelter for displaced residents. 

The distractions and frivolities in government responses are many. For instance, River Basin Authorities (RBDAs) have burnt ₦2.98 billion outside their mandates, on sewing machines, streetlights while floods hit states were hit hard, an FIJ analysis has shown. Ignoring due process, the RBDAs blatantly disregarded the specifications in the Basin Decree that spelt out the basic functions of the authorities, such as: flood control, erosion control, water supply, irrigation and pollution control. It has been established that the Alau Dam collapse has been caused by negligence of the Federal Ministry of Water Resources and, most especially, the Chad BRDA. It has also been established that, beyond the fiscal irresponsibility of the basin authorities, state governments are also not doing enough in terms of funding flood control and prevention. In particular, the flood-prone states reportedly spent far less than their ecological fund allocations on environmental protection in 2024. In the 2024 budget alone, the federal government allocated projects worth more than ₦624 billion to agencies outside their primary mandate. 

From Derna in Libya to Maiduguri in Nigeria, the story of incompetence, fraud and official neglect is self-evident. This is a snapshot of how corruption contributes to reduction of quality of life in Africa. It is a sad take of how the wrong actions of a few actors in government impact negatively on the generality of the people and how they endanger people’s lives. Africans can do better for themselves. They owe this debt of responsibility to pay. Let them be urgent about it.

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