Sudan as latest African orphan caught in crossfires
Dr. Olukayode Oyeleye, Business a.m.’s Editorial Advisor, who graduated in veterinary medicine from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, before establishing himself in science and public policy journalism and communication, also has a postgraduate diploma in public administration, and is a former special adviser to two former Nigerian ministers of agriculture. He specialises in development and policy issues in the areas of food, trade and competition, security, governance, environment and innovation, politics and emerging economies.
October 21, 2024473 views0 comments
THE GOALPOST ON ‘Silencing the Guns in Africa’ agenda has been shifted time and time again. Since this flagship initiative of the African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063 was mooted, the timelines and deadlines have been altered under various circumstances and events such that the agenda only turned out to become plain sloganeering and mere mantra. The Solemn Declaration by the AU heads of state and government to create the Silencing the Guns in Africa initiative on 26 May 2013 to mark the 50th anniversary of the AU and its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), originally entailed the pledge, “to end all wars in Africa by 2020.” In its detailed form, it aspired to end all wars and conflict, prevent genocide, and stop gender-based violence.
Inasmuch as ending conflict is crucial for Africa’s development, the African leaders have set a standard, a key indicator and a yardstick by which their success or failure could be measured. This is particularly so as ‘Silencing the Guns’ is one of the AU’s Agenda 2063 flagship projects theoretically aimed at achieving inclusive and sustainable socioeconomic development over a 50-year period from the commencement date in 2013. On that day and in that hall at Addis Ababa, representatives of the governments of Ethiopia and Sudan present must have shared the optimism and hope without any foreboding of any looming national gun violence crisis ahead.
Beyond just 2013, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) adopted an AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in November 2016. Ordinarily, Africa should have become gun-free if the roadmap – with all its wide range of actions – has succeeded in curbing the excesses of some of those leaders who held sway in the countries within the continent. As it turned out, three contiguous countries got to the brink of war over a major natural resource, notably water. Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia sparred for some years over Ethiopia’s ambitious Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) that nearly resulted in an all-out war. The AU had a hard time reigning in the nations, particularly Egypt and Ethiopia, on GERD.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, later dramatis personae in an Ethiopian civil war, was reputed and rewarded with the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize for his work in ending the 20-year post-war territorial stalemate war between Ethiopia and Eritrea led by the then Government of Ethiopia and current Government of Eritrea. In essence, he soon became a champion and an epitome of what the AU had articulated six years earlier. Little was known of the prospect of Abiy Ahmed leading Ethiopia to war so soon afterwards. The war, which lasted for two years – from November 2020 to November 2022 – was fought within Ethiopia between the central government under Abiy Ahmed and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The guns roared under Abiy Ahmed’s watch. They were not silenced: a significant test case of the AU slogan’s success or failure.
This cost of the war to Ethiopia, according to some estimates, in terms of expenditure as at August 2021, was projected to reach $502 million (£365 million) by the end of that year. At the end of it all, the post-conflict reconstruction, following a deal to end the two-year civil war, was also estimated to cost about $20 billion, in addition to requiring help from international institutions. Ethiopia was drawn back in many different ways, from record war fatalities to disease spread and human displacement. For instance, an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 people reportedly died, including 50,000 to 100,000 from fighting, 150,000 to 200,000 due to famine, and 100,000 from lack of medical attention. It was observed that the fatalities could have been as many as 600,000 people while those displaced could have been nearly three million as much of Tigray lived under siege for nearly two years, depending on very little food, medicine, humanitarian assistance or access to banks or telecommunications due to a blockade on the region. Despite the atrocities during the war, Abiy Ahmed still has two years to stay till his second term ends after October 4, 2026.
While it sounds nice now to have fully operational African Standby Force and prevent the circulation of illicit arms, as well as activities to address socio-economic and governance challenges, it was agreed by the AU Assembly at the December 6, 2020 extraordinary session on “Silencing the Guns” to extend the implementation of the AU Master Roadmap for a period of ten years from 2021 to 2030. The AU’s Silencing the Guns initiative and the AU Master Roadmap in resolution 2457 of February 27, 2019 were recognised and accepted during an open debate organised by the then-Council member, Equatorial Guinea. This was aimed at combating poverty, deprivation and inequality and to enhance good governance and redoubling efforts on economic development and the promotion of the well-being of their people.
In Sudan, for over the past year, the gun has not been silent. Since April 15, 2023, Sudan has been embroiled in a war of attrition between two generals fighting for supremacy. Ordinary Sudanese have been bearing the brunt. The devastating war between Sudan’s army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has left 15,000 dead and has driven more than 8.5 million people from their homes, in addition to rampant cases of rape, murder and hunger. The legacy of Sudan’s one year of war is now that more funding is needed to reach more people. Formally, the 2024 Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) is reportedly seeking $2.7 billion from donors to enhance its intervention in helping 14.7 million people through till the end of this year.
Sudan’s hostilities are spiralling, with no evidence of reprieve in sight. As of September 8, 2024, at least 20,000 people had been reportedly killed and 33,000 others injured. Social and economic activities in Sudan have gone comatose. Yet, the country reels in isolation. Dr. Workneh Gebeyehu, IGAD executive secretary, on April 14, 2024, during the first anniversary of the conflict, noted in a statement that the government of the war-ravaged Sudan said it has suspended its membership in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the east African regional body with member States of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda.
The executive secretary implored all belligerent parties to immediately halt hostilities, and prioritise the pursuit of a negotiated political settlement, noting the dire humanitarian situation and pervasive human suffering and recognising the consequential ramifications of the conflict on the stability of Sudan and the broader region. The executive secretary urged all stakeholders to work closely with IGAD and its designated Special Envoy, to work towards actively securing a nationwide cessation of hostilities and a sustainable ceasefire, and implementing humanitarian measures to help alleviate human suffering.
On the 6th of June 2019, the African Union Peace and Security (PSC) Council suspended the participation of the Republic of Sudan in all AU activities until the effective establishment of a civilian-led Transitional Authority, as the only way to allow Sudan to exit from its current crisis. It means, by this latest war, Sudan has descended further down the latter in a diplomatic abyss. If, despite the suspension, Sudan still slid into war, much less effectual would have been the suspension, thus necessitating a change of approach to diplomatic engagement as the country is now divided roughly in two: between the army which holds sway in much of the east, but with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) controlling much of the west and most of the capital Khartoum.
It is clear that the war in Sudan would not have been possible without some external enablers, who are arming them, as well as the African and global powers with the greatest influence in the region. These all need to come together in a coordinated push to keep Sudan from further collapse and help to ease the suffering of the country’s people. But experiences in the recent past offer very limited scope for any hope at all. In addition to the helplessness of the AU and UN on Ethiopia, Libya also found itself helpless in a quandary a few years ago. For a protracted period, the guns roared. They were not silent.
Years following elections in 2014 were particularly tough for Libya, which was split in half as a UN-recognised administration was based in Tripoli, the capital in the country’s west and the warlord’s parallel government took the east. In essence, Libya has been divided between the Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in Tripoli and that of Libya’s eastern forces under commander Khalifa Haftar. The renegade General Khalifa Haftar sometimes threatened and led a “decisive battle” to capture the capital, Tripoli. On April 4, 2019, Haftar mobilised his military forces to advance on Tripoli, the capital of the internationally recognised government of Libya. Again, the guns roared as the two governments fought a bloody civil war that lasted for over a year in which Haftar’s army tried to take Tripoli. General Haftar’s forces have been besieging the city since April 2019. But intensified military support from Turkey helped the government to weaken his forces.
But, over the last two years, the two warring parties have reached an uneasy and fragile truce, whereupon Haftar, in 2023, supported a proposal to set up a new interim government. However, attempts to form a viable, unified Libyan government by other means have repeatedly failed. The AU and UN have only had little impact, if any. It is thus very hard to conclude that the war in Libya is over completely. Rather, it can be inferred that the chances of a relapse remain high as the guns may not have completely gone silent in Libya. The influences of external forces remain potent and decisive in Africa’s civil wars and hostilities. For the guns to be truly silent, these external factors as well as internal factors will have to be juxtaposed with and weighed against the interests of specific African countries with clear intentions and appropriate diplomatic and policy decisions and actions. Otherwise, the AU’s Silencing the Guns will remain mere slogans.
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