When wars elsewhere affect Africa

A MAJOR REGIONAL CONFLICT is going on in the Middle East that has the potential of lingering for a while. It has many signs of what will turn out to be of wider ramifications for the region and beyond. To begin with, the humanitarian impacts are becoming evident as the civilian population is now being displaced from the northern part of the 40 km long and 11.2 km wide enclave known as Gaza Strip to its southern part. Trouble began on the penultimate weekend with the attacks on the civilian population in the adjoining southern Israel. The murders, molestations and abductions meted to Israeli civilians by the Sunni Islamist political and military organisation officially known as the Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas. This is the de facto government of Palestine in the Gaza Strip of the Palestinian territories, where over two million inhabitants live.

Concerns here are not about ideologies driving the Hamas movement, its reasons for launching several surprise attacks on Israel, why Israel was so vulnerable at the time of attack or how Israel decided to respond to the attacks. Rather, the concern will focus on the wider ramifications of the immediate and long term as well as remote and direct impacts of the invasion by Hamas on one hand and the reprisal attacks by Israel on the other. Egypt, the gateway to Africa from the Middle East, is already feeling the heat as the humanitarian crisis arising from the forced and hasty evacuation of fleeing Gaza residents is already taking a toll. Although Gaza was once under the control of Egypt, it was one of the major losses it incurred and price paid by Egypt in 1967 after it blockaded the Straits of Tiran in an attempt to cut off Israel shipping.

In retrospect, the six days of war that followed proved decisive for both Israel and Egypt as the latter lost the Gaza Strip to the former, thus ending Egypt’s occupation. In addition, Israel took the West Bank and some other territories which it was later to cede as it did to Gaza Strip now occupied by Palestinians. Now, Gaza Strip looks set to slip off the Palestinians’ hands as Israel pounds the northern part of the strip, destroying buildings and sending the occupants scampering for safety elsewhere under an ultimatum to leave. The fate of Gaza hangs in the balance as Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have launched ground offensives to complement the air raids of the past couple of days. Of great concern are the implications of the network of tunnels across Gaza and Israeli joint borders, the system of government run by Hamas and the links with other sympathetic groups or governments.

Disruption of peace in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region could become a significant fallout from the on-going Israeli-Gaza war which has claimed over 3,000 lives, with double that number as injured, in addition to the forced evacuation of over a million of people. Egypt is expected to feel the immediate and long term impact of this war as it will have to provide for humanitarian support for the displaced while also avoiding an infiltration of its territory by bad actors, particularly the extremists and terrorists. North Africa and East Africa may share part of the burden by choice or by circumstance. By choice, they could rally round Egypt to absorb some of the Gaza evictees and provide comfort and safety for them. By circumstance, they may find the need for assistance inevitable, especially if it will cost them less to assist proactively than to wait until the troubled people come knocking at their doors.

The impact of the fleeing Gaza residents will be widely distributed across the Arab and Muslim world of which Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia are in Africa. There is no doubting the fact that these countries, especially the members of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) – Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia – will have to step in to provide some succour. By extension, President Azali Assoumani of the Union of Comoros, may need to bring in the African Union (AU) which he currently chairs in 2023. For Africa, to look away from the impact is to live in denial of realities as countries within the continent will be faced with the dilemma of dealing with the two sides involved in the Gaza-Israeli conflict. They need to be realistic as well as neutral to avoid escalating the crisis or spreading it further afield. Diplomatic relationship with the parties to the conflict will require nimble, intricate and even-handed responses from the countries and regional groupings mentioned here so as not to upset existing positive relationships between Arab countries and Israel while the latter is being persuaded to end its military campaign in Gaza and other sympathetic countries are being dissuaded from escalating or prolonging the crisis while supporting the Palestinians.

For Egypt, it might be fairly tempting to skew its response against Israel. But a number of factors may make that a bit unlikely. Egypt has been treating Israel as a friendly country in recent times, with emphasis and strong ties in different fields, particularly security and economy. Egypt has food supply challenges and has to deal with it in ways that will provide for the citizens. In March, earlier this year, Egypt and Israel were discussing boosting bilateral trade ties, including importing food amidst shortages in Egypt. But Egypt is walking a tight rope as it also has to fend off the spill over of humanitarian crisis from Gaza, which President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi has described as a “red line.” The pressure on Egypt by the US may also hamstring El-Sisi on any possible idea of toeing a hard line against Israel in response to the latter’s disproportionate reprisal attack on Gaza. To the US, Egypt is regarded as a balancing factor in North Africa security considerations. A month ago, in September, the US – prioritising security over rights – approved a whopping $235 million aid to Egypt. This is likely to make the pressure of the US on Egypt irresistible on which side of the divide Egypt should lean.

Considering the fact that the Middle East is a chaotic region, Egypt’s moderating role is easily recognised based on a number of factors. Prominent among them are its status as the most populous Arab country, its geostrategic position at the connection of Africa and Asia, the historical role of Gamal Abdel Nasser, especially the overthrow of the monarchy and the last residues of colonialism as well as helping to lead the Non-Aligned Movement.  How El-Sisi intends to manage Egypt’s tie with Putin’s Russia under the present circumstance remains yet to be seen as it is insinuated that Russia may have taken sides with Iran which is a known supporter of Hamas. Historical facts about Iran’s involvement in many countries, particularly in the Middle East, have revealed that Iran is in bed with bad actors, particularly those that are regarded as terrorists. Iran has been rendering financial, material and military support to Hamas for a while.  Military intelligence has disclosed that Iran has provided technical help to Hamas. Although no direct evidence could be pinpointed, Iran is supposedly receiving “key support from Iranian allies who provided military training and logistical help as well as tens of millions of dollars for weapons,” Washington Post reports. It added that “the assault reflected Teheran’s years-long ambition to surround Israel with legions of paramilitary fighters armed with increasingly sophisticated weapons systems capable of striking deep inside the Jewish state.”

The approach to the last week’s attacks on Israel presupposes that, beyond harming Israel, it planned to protect itself – as done in the past – with human shields, an idea that Israel does not seem to consider a deterrent to counter attacks as it has continued to shell and bomb many Gaza positions suspected as shielding the Hamas attackers. Moreover, it appears as if Hamas – as part of its broader strategy – intended to use hostage diplomacy to extract some concessions from Israel as it has abducted many Israelis with the prior plan to use them for making demands. This does not appear relevant to Israel as it has vowed to embark on ground operations to rescue its captured citizens. How the reactions of countries in the Middle East will respond to the war in Gaza remains more of conjecture. For instance, the Iran-backed Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon have decided to come into the fray, firing shots at northern Israel at the Lebanon-Israeli border. Whether Hezbollah will withdraw or escalate its onslaught is yet to be known.

In addition to Iran, countries supporting Hamas have been named as Turkey and Qatar. A September 2014 report to the US House of Representatives on “Hamas Benefactors: A network of terror,” implicated Turkey as harbouring “a known terrorist and Hamas operative,” saying “this is the same Turkey that is a supposed US and NATO ally that is harbouring not just this member of Hamas, but it is known to be harbouring several of Hamas’ top operatives.” The report was unsparing on Qatar. It went down the memory lane, stating that “Qatar, the very same Qatar that the administration entrusted to monitor the Taliban five, who were swapped for Sergeant Bergdahl , and which it recently agreed to an $11 billion armed sale with, has been known to be perhaps the largest financial patron of Hamas.” It did not end there, the report added that “Not only does Qatar harbour Hamas figurehead Khaled Meshaal, Qatar reportedly threatened to exile him if Hamas accepted an Egyptian-backed cease fire agreement…” That was in 2014. It is yet to be known if Qatar has changed its approach since the lifting of its four years of blockade in January 2021. It has to be pointed out that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, namely Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, led a sea, land and air blockade of Qatar in 2017 mainly because of its alleged support for terrorism, as Qatar was alleged to have violated a 2014 agreement with the members of the GCC, of which Qatar is a member.

The weeks ahead will be of interest as the sources and level of support for Hamas become clearer. In addition to the obvious and predictable impacts of the Gaza-Israeli war on North Africa, the impacts on the Sub-Saharan countries need to be urgently put in perspectives and the mitigating factors put in place early to avoid or minimise negative multiplier effects such as security threats, particularly those that could erupt on the basis – or in the form – of cultural, religious and administrative considerations. Africa cannot afford to add the spillover effects of the Gaza-Israeli war to its own litany of security crises. Something urgent has to be done.