JOHN ONYEUKWU
John Onyeukwu, a lawyer and public policy analyst with interdisciplinary expertise in law, governance, and institutional reform, holds an LL.B (Hons) from Obafemi Awolowo University, an LL.M from the University of Lagos, and dual master’s degrees in Public Policy from the University of York and Central European University. He also earned a Mini-MBA. John has managed development projects on governance, public finance, civic engagement, and service delivery. He served on the Lagos SEEDS Technical Committee and led Kano State’s SEEDS Benchmarking. He is a published author.
On April 30, 2025, the National Judicial Council (NJC) concluded its 108th meeting, which took place over two days (April 29 and 30). At the end of that meeting, the Council announced the suspension of three judges for one year without pay. The affected judges are Justice Jane E. Inyang of the Court of Appeal, Uyo Division; Justice Inyang Ekwo of the Federal High Court, Abuja Division; and Justice Aminu Baffa Aliyu of the Federal High Court in Zamfara State. These decisions, among others, have sparked renewed debates about judicial accountability, integrity, and the sufficiency of disciplinary measures within Nigeria’s judicial system.
While the NJC’s action reflects an effort to uphold standards, it also reveals a deep institutional hesitation: Why stop at suspension for misconduct grave enough to merit a one-year penalty without pay? The better course, legally, ethically, and institutionally, would have been retirement or dismissal.
The legal and ethical standard
The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), provides under Paragraph 21 of Part I of the Third Schedule that the NJC has the power to “recommend to the President or the Governor the removal from office of judicial officers and to exercise disciplinary control over such officers.” When misconduct is established, the Council must not only ask: What is proportional? It must also consider: What preserves the sanctity of the judiciary?
Suspending a judge for a year implicitly acknowledges severe wrongdoing. But to have such a person return to the bench after a period of “cooling off” is to gamble with public confidence. As Justice Oputa famously said, “Justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done.” A judge who has been found wanting, especially at this level, casts a long shadow over every case they hear post-reinstatement.
Other jurisdictions have addressed this issue with finality. In the United States, for example, Article III stipulates that judges may only be removed by impeachment, but once serious misconduct is proven, retirement (with or without benefits) or resignation is the norm, never mere suspension. The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 permits suspension in minor cases but insists on protecting the public’s perception of judicial impartiality.
In the UK, the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office (JCIO) has consistently emphasised that “continued public confidence in the judiciary is the overriding consideration in judicial discipline.” Retirement or removal is applied when that confidence is irreparably damaged, even absent criminal conviction.
Practical implications of reinstatement
There are two dimensions to this problem: institutional trust and litigant prejudice. Can litigants trust the judgment of someone previously sanctioned for misconduct? Can fellow judges rely on them? Will lawyers approach their courtrooms with full faith?
Bringing back judges who have served suspension, particularly of such duration, reinforces a culture of minimal accountability. It undermines the credibility of judicial oversight mechanisms and disincentivizes whistleblowing within the system.
Case for mandatory retirement in serious misconduct
The NJC should adopt a bifurcated disciplinary policy:
- For minor infractions, suspension, warning, or reprimand should suffice.
- For grave infractions, suspension should only be used as a temporary measure while processes for retirement or removal are finalised.
The NJC can look to Section 292 of the 1999 Constitution, which allows for removal for “inability to discharge the functions of office or for misconduct.” This power should be used not sparingly, but responsibly and decisively.
Conclusion
The judiciary is the last hope of the common man. A judiciary that tolerates the return of judges guilty of serious breaches sends the wrong message, to its peers, to legal practitioners, and to the Nigerian people.
Suspension may serve a bureaucratic function. But justice, integrity, and public trust demand more. Where misconduct is proven and grave, reinstatement should never be an option. Instead, the NJC should firmly recommend retirement.
Justice, once compromised, must be cleansed not merely paused.
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