There are no eternal allies or perpetual enemies. Only eternal and perpetual interests.
Relations between India and China are rapidly thawing like the summer snow on their contentious Himalayan border. After five years of simmering tension since a deadly border clash, the two Asian powers have held high-level ministerial meetings over the past year, culminating in Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to China in seven years this week.
Contrast this rapprochement with increasing tension between India and its long-time ally, the United States. US President Donald Trump has imposed 50-percent tariffs on Indian imports, the highest among its trade partners, partly as punishment for India’s purchase of Russian oil. As US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent accusingly put it, India is “buying cheap oil and selling petrochemicals” that benefit “the richest families in India”.
Why is Trump pushing India away? What could the India-China relationship reset — Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping said in their meeting yesterday that their countries are partners, not rivals — portend for global geopolitics? Here’s what I said in a recent interview with Bloomberg.
Trump’s Nobel Prize obsession
India-US tensions appear to stem from Trump’s annoyance with Modi over recent diplomatic slights. When Trump took credit for resolving the latest India-Pakistan conflict and suggested he deserved the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts, the lack of enthusiastic endorsement from New Delhi likely rankled. But this personal dimension intersects with broader economic grievances.
India runs a large trade surplus with the US, though not as large as China’s with the US. Yet, Trump isn’t putting equivalent pressure on China. For good reason: China could hit back much harder than India could. Beijing controls critical minerals and other economic weapons that could make Trump back off quickly. India, by comparison, appears to be a much weaker country in Trump’s calculus, an easier target for demonstrating toughness without risking serious retaliation.
More tellingly, Trump refuses to put any direct pressure on Russia, the actual aggressor in the Ukraine conflict. Instead, he’s targeting India for purchasing Russian oil, trying to put indirect pressure on Moscow through New Delhi. The only reason I can think of for this approach is that Trump wants to be seen as a dealmaker while avoiding direct confrontation with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Strategies for dealing with Trump
In his now-infamous meeting with Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in February, Trump straight up said: “You have to be thankful [for the US], you don’t have the cards.” Every political leader is asking themselves the same question: As Washington becomes increasingly belligerent, what cards do I hold in my relationship with the US?
Sharp tariff hikes on Indian goods, public criticism of India’s Russian oil purchases, and volatile messaging from the White House have reset New Delhi’s expectations of the US as a stable partner. For India, the consolation – if you could call it that – is that it’s not the only country being hit by Trump. Countries as varied as Australia, Canada, Brazil and Ukraine are scrambling to develop strategies and contingencies to deal with Trump’s abrupt shifts in tariffs and foreign policy.
One tactic is the fawning praise strategy, which the Europeans and the Japanese are employing. We really don’t know whether that has worked because there are no details in the deals they have struck with Trump. For instance, the Europeans and the Japanese are promising to invest massive amounts in the US, but their governments have no way of compelling their companies to do so.
The second strategy is to buy your way out: Throw a lot of money or investments at the US, like what the Middle East is doing in constructing data centres. The third strategy is to stand strong against Trump. For countries lacking leverage – and this includes India – they have to form coalitions and stand strong together. But this invariably leads to what game theory calls the prisoner’s dilemma: Every country is incentivised to defect and cut its own deal. As a result, these coalitions are very difficult to sustain.
The Trump threat is an opportunity for these smaller countries to forge closer ties. But many of the groupings, whether BRICS (a geopolitical bloc that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) or ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), tend to be more aspirational than real. Countering the US would require much closer cooperation within these blocs.
Geography over politics
Could China and India work together? Both are members of BRICS and see a role for the bloc, but with very different visions. India sees BRICS as non-West but doesn’t want it to become anti-West; China sees BRICS as a way to counteract American bullying. This has led to tensions between India and China.
But now, caught between American pressure and their own national interests, both India and China are looking towards each other for comfort, recognising they can benefit from each other’s economies. This rapprochement will take time. However, I don’t think the obstacles are nearly as insurmountable as they appear.
The border clashes and China’s support for Pakistan represent real differences, but geography ultimately matters in international relations. The Himalayas are a buffer that lowers the probability of large-scale war, and the disputed zones are sparsely populated. That creates space for managed competition. Moreover, Chinese investments in Pakistan haven’t been performing well, making China’s pivot towards India a natural strategic adjustment.
China and India are natural partners in many ways: extensive people-to-people exchanges, a shared history of colonisation, part of the Global South (an awkward term by the way) and complementary economic strengths.
From rivalry to partnership?
If both sides want a functional relationship, they can move on two tracks, economic and security, with separate timetables. Focus on small wins, such as restoring flights and visas, restarting investments, creating working groups at various levels, and confidence-building protocols at the border. These build habits of cooperation and reduce the chance of friction escalating.
In the long run, the fundamentals in geopolitics don’t change. Countries have to focus on economics and ensure their economy grows. That’s how they get “cards”, to use Trump’s parlance. India needs sustained growth for two decades and greater openness – more trade deals and higher export intensity will help. China needs reliable partners and markets for its products as it climbs the technology ladder.
At the same time, countries must be more self-reliant in defence because they cannot rely on US security protection or Russian security protection. In sum, all countries have to tackle the delicate balancing act of being self-sufficient in certain realms and closely cooperating with other countries in other realms.
One mistake that political leaders should not make is thinking of Trump as an aberration. Perhaps Joe Biden, his Democratic predecessor, was an aberration. But something has shifted in the US: It has become inward-looking, belligerent and transactional. All other countries have to make different shifts in their economic outlook and people exchanges to adapt to this new normal.
For now, Trump’s belligerent approach may inadvertently accelerate a pragmatic realignment between Asia’s two giants. If New Delhi and Beijing bank small wins, separate economics from security, and prevent domestic politics from hijacking the process, their long-running rivalry can be managed. It may even become a partnership.
