Coups, regional diplomacy and intra-African trade

NIAMEY, CAPITAL CITY OF Niger Republic, hosted the 12th Extraordinary summit of the African Union on July 7, 2019 in which Africa successfully launched the operational phase of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which entered into force five weeks earlier on May 30. Fifteen months before Niamey, in Kigali, Rwanda, the AfCFTA agreement was adopted and opened for signature on March 21, 2018. One of the five instruments adopted at the operational phase of AfCFTA was the African Trade Observatory. The observatory is a trade information portal to address hindrances to trade in Africa due to lack of information about opportunities, trade statistics as well as information about exporters and importers in countries. The trade observatory is expected to have all relevant information and data provided by AU member states     

Four years after that historic meeting, Niamey enacted another event that underscores one of the reasons why the instruments of AfCFTA are yet to be effective or why they may not be in the foreseeable future. On July 26, 2023, the military overthrew the government of Mohamed Bazoum, ending his reign as the president of Niger. A core justification for the overthrow was given by the military as the “continually deteriorating security situation.” Internally, there was the ethnicity factor. Externally, however, the presence of foreign military forces was palpable and became an issue in weeks that followed as the military leaders began to call for their withdrawal, particularly those of France. The weakness of regional bodies came to the fore as one of the things the military leaders were unhappy about. Unsurprisingly, the African Union (AU) was docile while the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) went on overdrive.

In a swift response, the overreacting ECOWAS threatened military invasion, suspended relations with Niger and closed their land and air borders with Niger. It was most unlikely that ECOWAS least expected the next reactions as the governments of Burkina Faso and Mali –both led by military rulers – issued a joint statement to warn ECOWAS. In their statement, ECOWAS was told in clear terms that any invasion of Niger could lead to military response from their countries in solidarity with Niger. Irrespective of whatever the Western pundits might say, the subterfuge of democracy has not helped Niger in overcoming its major crisis – which is insecurity. This is the same as in the other three countries of West Africa already under military regimes, namely Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea Conakry. Guinea Bissau narrowly missed falling into the hands of the military in February 2022.

Days before, at the end of January, ECOWAS had announced that it was cutting ties with Burkina Faso where a coup had just successfully occurred.  ECOWAS had earlier placed sanctions on Mali after its military leaders attempted to extend the time set for transition to democratic rule by five years. To underscore the mistaken extent of influence and exaggerated sense of importance, the military rulers of these countries remained defiant. The grandstanding ECOWAS leaders held on to one line of argument for their actions, essentially saying that the military takeovers were threatening democracy. Sadly, however, those who are in a better position to assess the impact of democracy are disgruntled and discontented with what their democratically elected leaders have been doing. The soldiers have therefore been riding on the back of these sentiments to seize and retain power in the countries so far affected.

The upsurge in cases of coups is a good reason to show that – more than just celebrating democracy as a concept –it is important to invest in rule of law and governance in times of peace. This will make the enforcement easier during conflict.  Moreover, the crises have exposed the challenge of fostering democratic norms beyond elections. In Mali, for instance, protesters who have been on the streets for three months since June were displeased with the government’s management of the on-going insurgency. They alleged government corruption, a floundering economy and poor handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, many Malians regarded President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) as a symbol of government corruption, of international interference and inaction, of persistent instability, lack of health care, infrastructure, and education. The president has become an embodiment of failures of governance, resulting in losses of lives of many Malians. Yet, ECOWAS that was treating IBK with kid gloves in his failed government was quick and firm in sanctioning the military leaders that took over power. The AU too seemed content in standing by, doing very little.

Managing the aftermath of the coup d’état in countries of Africa in the past four years or thereabouts has been largely dismal. In particular, the knee jerk reactions to the countries affected have been ill-informed and lacking in strategy. The ECOWAS has both poorly managed its response to the coups and has escalated the negative impacts on the regional economy in predictable ways. Apart from the similar general effects in all the countries now under military leadership, from Mali in the west to Sudan in the east, the peculiar ECOWAS situation is noteworthy. Sudan’s peculiar situation was occasioned by the military officers’ lack of intention to return the country to civilian regime. That was manifested by its flip flops on the interim government in which Abdalla Hamdok was first appointed as prime Minister to give some legitimacy to the regime. He was subsequently disgracefully removed, reinstated and he eventually resigned due to irreconcilable differences. This whole period was marred by street protests and brutal crackdown on protesters across Sudan.

Like in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea Conakry and Niger, these have not provided the right atmosphere for investment and trade with other countries in the continent, and are particularly not conducive to transborder trade and movement of people. In Sudan, it got worse when the hostilities that broke out between the army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo of the Rapid Support Forces snowballed into war affecting Khartoum, the capital, which is supposed to be the seat of power and official decision making. The regional insecurity which has threatened lives and greatly diminished the economy of Mali has played a major role in slowing down the operations of AfCFTA and denying the continent of the anticipated gains. Consider Mali’s operation Barkhane and the threat of terrorism and the same phenomenon in Guinea Conakry, Burkina Faso and — more recently — Niger. Like cutting the nose to spite the face, ECOWAS blacklist of affected countries and the harsh sanctions did more harm than good and has affected those countries that issued the sanctions in definite ways. They further drove wedges between countries and denied even the other ECOWAS countries the benefits of trade. AfCFTA office in Accra will more likely attest to the impact in nearly three years of operations

Insecurity and cross-border conflicts in the Sahel are linked to poor governance, discrimination, inequalities, scarcity of resources and insensitivity to external threats.  The so-called democratic countries live in complacency, making them more vulnerable to terror attacks and economic crises. ECOWAS and the AU have been feeble in their handling of these crises. Burkina Faso and Mali have already been overshadowed by serial cases of insecurity, forced migration, and population displacements while cross-border transhumance from Niger now appears to be more limited to certain states and routes, depending on level of security. In the Sahel region, insecurity is also promoted by extensive trans-border smuggling, especially directly involving weapons trafficking and hiring of combatants. Jihadist challenge, military coup d’état, violent extremism and poor governance are complex security problems that have escalated into national conflicts, state failure, internal displacements, and forced migration. Many countries in the Sahel have experienced these due to the confluence of weak and illegitimate governance, economic decline, and the worsening effects of climate change, transcending national borders and posing significant challenges to countries both in and outside the ECOWAS region. The criminals’ hideouts, epicentres of violence and humanitarian disaster are in the Liptako Gourma tri border region, which borders Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, and the Lake Chad Basin subregion between Nigeria, Niger and Chad.

Fragmentation of African countries fundamentally impacts negatively on trans-border trade and movement of people. Security crisis makes it even worse. AfCFTA is expected to cover a market of 1.2 billion customers and an estimated $3 trillion in combined GDP, with the potential of increasing intra-African trade by 50 per cent. Although Africa is endowed with many commodities that are traded in world markets, the continent has benefited least from global trade, compared to other regions of the world. Despite having 30 percent of the world’s mineral reserves and accounting for more than 20 per cent of global annual production of five key minerals, 60 percent of world’s arable land, 13 percent of the global population and about 60 percent of its population under the age of 25 and abundant energy potentials, very little progress has been recorded in terms of economic development and growth. In spite of the vast wealth in natural capital endowments, African economies remain among the least developed in the world with the size of economies amongst the lowest compared to other regions.  Undoubtedly, hurdles of political turmoil, infrastructural gaps and security threats remain daunting among the various impediments.

The regional economic communities (RECs) are operating below expectations. Their impacts have been poorly felt in critical areas, particularly economy and trade as well as regional security. With the recognition of the AfCFTA as pan-African trade and an engine for local economic growth and prosperity, the eight RECs in Africa ought to have been at the forefront in the crusade for enhancing competitiveness and trade within regional value chains. They are expected to turn the market potential of 1.2 billion people with a combined GDP of 3.4 trillion US dollars into a global economic powerhouse through accelerated intra-Africa trade. This ought to leverage upon the development of regional value chains with increased value addition, higher productivity, and competitiveness. It is advised that, rather than getting overly fixated on sanctioning military leaders and their regimes, leaders of those that still operate civilian administration should lead by examples through robust common public-private sector vision, effectively harmonised trade rules, breaking down non-tariff barriers and  increasing regulatory transparency. They should nurture and sustain efficient business support services including national quality infrastructure, conformity assessment to create trust between trading partners within and between countries. They should deploy their influences to establish and sustain a good understanding of market opportunities and facilitation of business match-making, growing infrastructure and trade logistics, effective banking services and payment system.     

Rather than chasing the shadows by coming hard after the coup leaders, these are some core areas upon which ECOWAS – and other REC – leaders should be focusing their attention, energy and resources.