Elections are supposed to solve a fundamental democratic problem: how do citizens ensure that those who exercise political power remain accountable to them? Yet, as Nigeria approaches the 2027 general election, the political conversation risks becoming preoccupied with who will occupy the presidency rather than what those seeking power intend to do with it.
The All Progressives Congress (APC) intends to campaign on President Bola Tinubu’s record. Six opposition parties are reportedly exploring the possibility of presenting a common presidential candidate. Meanwhile, concerns about voter apathy raise questions about whether Nigerians will participate in sufficient numbers to determine the country’s political direction.
These are more than three separate electoral developments. Together, they expose a deeper challenge: whether Nigeria’s democracy can connect political competition to institutional accountability and tangible improvements in citizens’ lives.
The incumbent wants another mandate. The opposition wants an alternative pathway to power. Citizens want better governance. The accountability test is whether these competing ambitions can be translated into credible commitments, measurable outcomes and consequences for failure.
The APC is entitled to campaign on Tinubu’s record. Indeed, an incumbent seeking re-election should explain what it promised, what it delivered, what remains outstanding and why another mandate would serve the public interest. But the right to present a record does not confer the right to determine unilaterally how that record should be judged.
Governments frequently present policy decisions as achievements in themselves. Yet a reform is an intervention, not proof of success. Its merits must ultimately be established through its outcomes.
The Tinubu administration can point to significant changes in fuel subsidy policy, foreign-exchange management and revenue mobilisation. These interventions address longstanding structural distortions and have been defended as necessary to restore macroeconomic stability. Their significance should not be dismissed simply because their immediate consequences have been difficult for many Nigerians. But neither should the difficulty of implementation become an excuse for postponing accountability.
Have these reforms improved household purchasing power? Are businesses becoming more productive and competitive? Are employment opportunities expanding? Are increased public revenues translating into better infrastructure and essential services? Are citizens receiving greater value from public expenditure?
These questions distinguish policy implementation from policy outcomes, and both form the ultimate test of improved welfare.
This is where political economy becomes indispensable. Economic policies do not operate in a vacuum. Their outcomes depend on institutional capacity, political incentives, the distribution of costs and benefits, and the quality of public expenditure. A government may improve its revenue position without proportionately improving public services. Macroeconomic indicators may stabilise while households continue to struggle with food, transportation, housing and healthcare costs.
The electoral question, therefore, is not simply whether Tinubu has undertaken reforms. It is whether those reforms are delivering measurable improvements, whether their costs are being distributed fairly and whether the institutions responsible for implementation can sustain the gains.
The government must also explain how it intends to address the adverse consequences that citizens continue to experience. A credible record should acknowledge progress and unfinished business, rather than treating criticism as hostility to reform.
The reported discussions among six opposition parties about a common presidential candidate could alter the electoral arithmetic. Nigeria’s political history demonstrates that opposition consolidation can change electoral outcomes. However, the ability to unite around a candidate is not the same as the ability to govern together.
An electoral alliance may be sustained by a common desire to defeat an incumbent. A governing coalition must survive the more demanding task of reconciling competing interests, agreeing on policy priorities, establishing decision-making rules and maintaining the discipline required to implement a shared programme.
These challenges are embedded in the political economy of coalition-building. Each participating party has its own leadership ambitions, constituencies, organisational interests and expectations about the distribution of power. What benefits the coalition collectively may conflict with what individual members consider advantageous.
Without credible agreements and mechanisms for resolving disputes, unity can become a temporary accommodation among political elites rather than a durable governing arrangement.
There is also the problem of voter credibility. Nigerians have witnessed repeated political realignments, sometimes without corresponding changes in policy positions or governance practices. An alliance cannot assume that the supporters of participating parties will automatically transfer their allegiance to a common candidate.
It must explain what it proposes to do differently and why its approach is likely to produce better outcomes.
How will it address insecurity? What is its programme for employment, productivity and social protection? How will it manage public finances and strengthen accountability? What institutional reforms will it pursue? How will it prevent public resources from becoming instruments of partisan patronage?
The APC itself emerged from a coalition of political forces that defeated the then-governing People’s Democratic Party in 2015. That experience demonstrates the electoral potential of political consolidation, but it also reinforces the distinction between winning power and exercising it effectively.
The opposition should therefore be judged not simply by its ability to negotiate a common candidacy, but by the credibility of its programme, the legitimacy of its candidate-selection process and its capacity to manage competing interests after victory.
A coalition against an incumbent is an electoral strategy. A coalition with a credible programme for governing Nigeria is a potential democratic alternative.
The third question may ultimately be the most consequential: will Nigerians participate?
The 2023 presidential election offers a sobering baseline. Approximately 93.47 million people were registered to vote, but only about 24.97 million votes were cast. Turnout was approximately 26.7 percent of registered voters.
The figures reveal a substantial gap between registration and participation. Yet describing the problem simply as voter apathy risks overlooking the institutional conditions that shape citizens’ decisions.
People may care deeply about politics but doubt that their votes will count. They may distrust electoral administration, fear violence or believe that political competition will not produce meaningful improvements in governance. These factors do not explain every instance of non-participation, and citizens retain a responsibility to exercise their democratic rights. But civic responsibility must be matched by institutional responsibility.
A democracy cannot continually demand citizens’ participation without demonstrating that participation matters. This is a problem of political efficacy: the belief that citizens can influence political outcomes through their actions. When that belief weakens, the incentive to participate declines. Lower participation can, in turn, weaken the pressure on elected officials to respond to citizens, further eroding public trust.
Breaking this cycle requires more than voter education campaigns. It requires credible electoral administration, transparent procedures, effective protection against electoral violence, meaningful political competition and consequences for misconduct.
INEC has a central constitutional responsibility to conduct elections in accordance with the law. Political parties, security agencies, the courts and other relevant institutions also have obligations to protect electoral integrity.
The objective should not be merely to increase turnout. It should be to ensure that citizens can participate freely, safely and confidently, with reasonable assurance that their choices will be respected. Voter participation cannot be sustained by appeals to patriotism alone. It also depends on whether institutions give citizens reason to believe that their participation makes a difference.
These three developments ultimately raise one question: can electoral competition become a more effective instrument of public accountability?
The incumbent must defend its record against measurable outcomes, not merely favourable political messaging. The opposition must demonstrate that its proposed alternative rests on a credible programme of government, not simply an agreement among political elites. Electoral institutions must create the conditions under which citizens can make their choices freely and trust that those choices will be respected.
These responsibilities are related, but they are not identical. The incumbent bears the responsibility of defending its exercise of power. The opposition bears the responsibility of demonstrating that it offers a credible alternative. Electoral institutions must provide a fair process through which citizens can choose between competing political propositions.
Citizens, in turn, must look beyond campaign promises and assess candidates against standards of performance, integrity, institutional commitment and policy credibility.
Political parties should be challenged to explain not only what they intend to achieve, but how they will achieve it, what resources their commitments require, what trade-offs are involved and how citizens will assess their performance. This would shift the electoral debate from competing narratives about personalities to competing propositions about governance.
Such a shift is particularly important in a country where economic pressures, insecurity and institutional weaknesses reinforce one another. Nigeria’s problems cannot be resolved through political rhetoric alone. They require institutions capable of converting public resources into public value, policies that expand productive opportunities and political leadership willing to submit itself to scrutiny. The 2027 election offers an opportunity to demand precisely that.
The APC must explain why its record merits another mandate. The opposition must demonstrate why its alternative deserves public confidence. INEC and other relevant institutions must protect the integrity of the electoral process. And citizens must insist that those seeking their votes articulate credible plans for improving their lives.
The stakes extend beyond the identity of the next president. They concern the relationship between citizens and the state, between the exercise of power and the obligation to account for it, and between the promise of reform and the delivery of prosperity.
An election is not a substitute for good governance. It is the mechanism through which citizens should be able to demand it. Nigeria’s democratic test in 2027 will not be satisfied merely because an incumbent retains power or an opposition candidate defeats it. The deeper test is whether political competition strengthens accountability, improves institutional performance and establishes a more credible pathway from public policy to citizens’ welfare.
That is the standard against which every candidate, coalition and political party should be judged.
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John Onyeukwu, is a lawyer and public policy analyst with interdisciplinary expertise in law, governance, and institutional reform. He holds an LL.B (Hons) from Obafemi Awolowo University, an LL.M from the University of Lagos, and dual master’s degrees in Public Policy from the University of York and Central European University. He also earned a Mini-MBA. John has managed development projects on governance, public finance, civic engagement, and service delivery. He can be reached on john@apexlegal.com.ng
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