Grim omen as ECOWAS loses Burkina, Mali, Niger (3)

TIME FOR SCORECARD. It is now 2034. The epitaph in front of the edifice that once served as the headquarters of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Abuja has this message: “Here stands this monument as a reminder and testament of a grandiose dream and an aspiration of some past leaders and founding fathers of independent West African countries, but scuttled by indiscretion of their successors in office.” According to legend, in 2027, the African regional economic block known as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) became a lame duck after series of diplomatic relations blunders and missed opportunities for fence mending with some disgruntled countries, leading to a cataclysmic ending. Eleven years ago, a certain member country known as Niger fell under military rule after a successful toppling of the civilian government of one Mohamed Bazoum, a flamboyant civilian president who presided over a country adjudged as one of the four poorest countries in Africa during his regime. The response of ECOWAS irked those soldiers who dared the regional bloc to do its worse as they took the immediate and harsh response from ECOWAS in their stride and chose to ignore the subregional body’s threats of sanctions.

ECOWAS, under the leadership of one Nigerian president that was sworn into office barely four weeks before the Niger coup, chose a hardline stance against Niger, which ultimately backfired and portrayed ECOWAS as mere bully and a rabble rouser. Niger was emboldened by the failure of ECOWAS or Nigeria to carry out the threat of invasion of Niger and reinstallation of the deposed Bazoum. ECOWAS lost its respect, and so did Nigeria, because of what Niger considered unacceptable measures meted out to the military junta. This was the ECOWAS familiar playbook response of ostracisation, economic blockade, border closure and exclusion of countries that carried out military coups shortly before Niger, namely Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea Conakry from ECOWAS regional activities. The strength and resoluteness of ECOWAS was thus put to the test by Niger’s defiance in which case ECOWAS turned out as clearly unable to make good its threats of invasion of Niger.

Rather than bending those countries’ military leaders into submission, the hard measures of ECOWAS against them triggered obstinacy and refusal to yield ground or bend. Subsequent diplomatic overtures to Niger by ECOWAS became ineffectual and failed as afterthoughts. The self-removal of the three countries was once described by a commentator as “ECOWAS Brexit,” an allusion to a similar decision taken 18 years ago, in 2016, in which Britain decided to exclude itself from the European Union regional bloc.  Very early, 10 years ago, three of the four countries banded together and announced their exit from ECOWAS, paving way to the decline of the regional economic bloc as more countries followed. The West African CFA, a currency commonly used by the region’s francophone countries and Guinea Bissau (a Portuguese-speaking country) lost appeal and each of the four countries ruled by the military floated their own common currency towards the end of 2024, in essence suggesting stronger economic relations. That was about three years before the ultimate collapse of the ECO earlier meant for all the wider ECOWAS. The ECO still floundered at its relaunch seven years ago, in 2027, despite the expectations of raised six years earlier in June 2021, by the roadmap adopted by the Heads of State of the ECOWAS. That these leaders were incapable of launching a common currency after that initiative of the common currency “ECO” was proposed since 2000, was indeed an indictment on the ECOWAS leaders over all these years.

To further test the will of ECOWAS, the military junta in Guinea decided to tweak its transition calendar by suspending transition calendar, dropping key government appointees and choosing replacements, including an appointed prime minister. This decision became a diplomatic hot potato for ECOWAS. By 2025, the economic hardship in Nigeria has become a subregional crisis as leadership in more and more West African countries have turned into military government. In Nigeria, its government was muddling through its country’s contrived political, social and economic crisis, preventing it from leading the sub-region as expected when it was vested with the leadership position.

Unfortunately, however, the leaders at the forefront of ECOWAS affairs had moral baggages, preventing them from going beyond percepts or moving up to higher standard of leading by example. Macky Sall, now the life president of Senegal, began in a rather subtle, stealthy and unsuspecting manner when he launched needless attacks on his political rival, Ousmane Sonko, whom he ultimately incarcerated before the election cycle that broke the traditional two-term presidency. Sall, like ivorian Ouattara, initially vehemently denied any plan to rule beyond the constitutionally approved two term. Ten years on, Sonko still remains incarcerated as his release, in Sall’s calculation and reckoning, could spark off unrests and a threat to his now despotic government. Even at that, pockets of mass protests and violence have been recorded since Sall became a life president. Senegal has almost lost all the trappings and attractions of tranquility arising from security, peace and political stability of the years preceding his presidency.

Sall was not the first in ECOWAS to alter his country’s constitution to pave way for a third term. Alpha Condé did it in Guinea and got sworn in for the third term which was shortlived as the military took over, deposing Condé. As if to reinforce the aberration, Alassane Ouattara did same in Côte d’Ivoire and got into office in a controversial circumstance in December of 2020. The election on which Bola Tinubu rode to power as Nigerian president came under criticisms as one that was rigged and remained dogged with the allegations of judicial malfeasance and travesty. These moral baggages became great impediment for these men in power when West Africa mostly needed to take decisions of great consequences for the region’s future as they did not exhibit higher standard of morality in matters of how they got into office. By their actions, they diminished the value, esteem and expectations on democracy as these frontliners were said to lack true democratic credentials expected of leaders in what was portrayed as democratic governments.

Towards the end of 2024, something remarkable happened. It was a culmination of an earlier event in the year when the military junta in Guinea Conakry dared ECOWAS. Rather than commencing the promised electoral process for the return to civilian government, Mamady Doumbouya’s decision as the head of military government was to appoint new subordinates after dropping those that earlier governed under him. The ECOWAS was in a fix. A former Nigerian military ruler, Yakubu Gowon, in a rather subtle astuteness, urged the ECOWAS leaders to tread carefully with countries under military rule and consider better ways of engagement rather than the harsh measures they called sanctions. It wasn’t immediately clear whether or not the ECOWAS frontliners would heed Gowon’s call to reason. It appeared like the leaders of Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo and Nigeria — all with outsized ego — were confident that ECOWAS could move on irrespective of the reactions from those military junta leaders.

Something not altogether unexpected happened. While ECOWAS was attempting to wield the big stick of sanctions against Guinea Conakry for its military leaders’ perceived belligerence, the military leaders outpaced the ECOWAS by announcing their collaboration and alliance with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger and that they too were pulling out of ECOWAS. Surprisingly, that same year marked a watershed for the West African regional trade as the four countries had forged seamless boundaries that began to enable unprecedented cross-border trade that surpassed in one year what the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) has not achieved in the preceding ten years. They had no difficulty in solving the currency convertibility problem as their own new currency aided easy flow of commerce and people. It added a big boost to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as the movement of goods and services became a lot easier across the four countries. Terrorists attacks were brought to a very low level in the course of effective sharing of intelligence reports among them. Contrary to predictions, insecurity became a lesser problem among those four countries.

In the following year, 2025, which was supposed to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the ECOWAS, the regional economic bloc was already tottering and wobbling, with little chance of survival. Anniversary programme drawn up ahead of the event began to look like mere wishful thinking as three other countries have fallen under military rule. ECOWAS headquarters came under an unprecedented dilemma: to celebrate the anniversary with seven countries or create a façade that all was well with all members.

Faure Gnassingbé, who has spent 29 years as Togolese president since he took over the leadership reins from his late father in 2005, remains a prominent figure among ECOWAS leaders wielding a big stick against countries that were taken over by the military. His locus standi, though untenable, remained unchallenged and has not been considered a deterrence in his vocal support for those against military takeovers. With him at the helm of affairs of Togo, and working alongside Sall and Ouattara, any surprise why ECOWAS became a mere regional association by name and why it eventually imploded? The reasons for the audacity of soldiers of many other countries taking over government could easily have been figured out in this past decade when democracy was supposed to have been consolidated. Now that half of the ECOWAS countries have come under military rule since 2030 and they remain so till now, where are those qualified to lead the way out of this conundrum? Over a decade ago in East Africa, when it became apparent that a major political actor wanted to subvert the will of the people during an electoral process, the Supreme Court of Kenya gave a landmark verdict that curbed the excesses of the politician’s camp, restoring the confidence of the people in the country’s judiciary and constitution as well as keeping the country’s democracy on the right course.

Should the rest of Africa look up to Kenya because of its landmark achievement in which the three arms of government were allowed to function independently then, over 10 years ago? What about the socioeconomic crises that trailed the country because its has had to cope with the troubled neighbouring countries that have been struggling to remain stable, such as terrorist-ridden Somalia, or the highly endowed Ethiopia that has been grappling with unsteady peace, security and economic instability since the exit of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed who superintended over the war with Tigray that ended in a tenuous ceasefire 12 years ago in 2022? How the East Africa hopes to convince the continent and the rest of the world about its commitment to democracy and the rule of law still remains a matter of conjecture.  With the stories of an octogenarian Yoweri Museveni losing hold of Uganda because of his advanced age as possibly the oldest president in Africa after the exit of Cameroon’s Paul Biya, the downside of having a geriatric in charge of a country’s affairs has become apparent, especially for a country that is struggling economically under food crisis, unemployment and social unrests. This year, the Rwanda strongman Paul Kagame — now 75 — is expected to fulfill his promise to step down after 34 unbroken years of rule, having taken power since 2000. His exit, even if he respects his promise, still holds uncertain future for Rwanda that has proved to have some success since the beginning of the millennium. Fears still remain that the majority Hutus, which make up about 85 per cent of Rwanda’s population, might return to the trenches against the minority Tutsi if Kagame does not allow a Hutu successor.

Anticipating the type of historical report that could emanate on the ECOWAS in the next 10 years on the basis of current events was the basis of this write-up. In reality, it will hardly be surprising if the reports take the form depicted here when it comes to 2034. What may well alter it depends a lot on strict deviation from the way the subregional body is currently being run. A change of leadership, with the replacement of those who currently parade themselves as ECOWAS champions will make s positive difference for the simple fact that their conducts currently contradict their declarations. They represent what should not be found among those who would lead ECOWAS into a future of hope and opportunities. Except they are out of the way, ECOWAS will sink deeper and deeper into the quagmire of social and political insecurity and economic instability. In a few years ahead, reference to the existence of ECOWAS may be in the past tense.