DOMINOES ARE FALLING in quick succession, in Latin America and the Middle East. Africa may be the next in line on the global map. The reset that could follow may only be better figured out as more and more events unfold with the reconfiguration of the global political and economic landscape. Geopolitics, strategic interests and economic considerations are at the core of the events that will shape the future of these continents in general and of specific countries in the regions.
In January, events that have built up for years culminated in the removal of Nicolás Maduro as the president of Venezuela. Before this, the US president, Donald Trump, had advised Maduro to step down and seek asylum elsewhere. On January 3, 2026, the US launched a military strike in which it captured incumbent Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro and his wife, thus decapitating his administration. Earlier, according to diplomatic sources, Maduro reportedly rejected the negotiated solution that Russia presented in form of a formal proposal to the United States through Vatican mediation to facilitate his departure from Venezuela to Russia in the months leading up to the military operation that resulted in his capture.
Maduro was said to have concerns about his personal circumstances in exile, his potential loss of control over foreign financial assets and demanded complete immunity, economic assurances and the ability to maintain a comfortable living standard in Russia, conditions that were reportedly not accepted. Just as Maduro made some wrong assumptions, leading to his decision to defy the US, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i had done the same. Like Maduro, Khamene’i refused to heed the advice to take up asylum elsewhere. Last Saturday, he was eliminated alongside some key top officials.
What the US did to Maduro and Khamene’i appears more like regional strategic reset, involving reducing Russia’s and China’s influence and the liberation of people of both countries from the stranglehold of Socialist regime on one hand and extreme Islamic ideologies dressed up as order and spirituality on the other.
On this note, it appears like Maduro and Khamene’i wrongly hedged their bets on possible support from the alliances they have cultivated as the allies did nothing to protect them in the course of their defiance despite the options of soft landings presented to them. Here, a quick look at the fallacy of BRICS might help facilitate some clearer understanding. Iran, for instance, was a latecomer and a new member of the expanded BRICS, an alliance of nations and South-South cooperation, led by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. BRICS, a group now made up of eleven countries, namely: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Iran, serves as a political and diplomatic coordination forum for countries from the Global South in the most diverse areas.
For years, Iran believed that China and Russia would stand by it in a confrontation with the United States, but, as earlier noted, geopolitics is transactional, not emotional. In the present circumstance, China and Russia will have to recalibrate their alliance with Iran while keeping their strategic interests intact. Even under BRICS, the promise of a globally strong and acceptable alternative to the dollar for the global payment system may have suffered some setbacks. On the economic frontier, therefore, Iran may have found itself more vulnerable, particularly as the odds in the oil industry seems to be shifting more in favour of the US. Accordingly, they are unlikely to stand by Iran at this time. The question of whether the removal of Ali Khamene’i from Iran will affect its membership of BRICS in coming years and to what extent has become necessary. And if it does, in what practical ways would the effects likely manifest?
On bilateral relations, it is worth noting how well Venezuela or Iran has fared with Russia or China. For years, Iran believed that China and Russia would stand by it in a confrontation with the US, but geopolitics is transactional, not emotional. And that is what defines the limits. While Teheran deepened ties through oil exports, drone cooperation and joint naval drills, Beijing and Moscow calculate risk differently. China depends on gulf stability for energy security, with nearly 20 percent of global oil flowing through the Strait of Hormuz. Russia, stretched by Ukraine, avoids direct confrontation with the US. If escalation comes, both powers will protect their own economies and strategic priorities first. The so-called anti-Western axis may share interests, but not existential commitments.
It is now important to get it right that although, for over two decades, Venezuela served as a cornerstone of Russia’s geopolitical presence in the Western Hemisphere through energy cooperation agreements, arms sales and political support against Washington, Venezuela’s two main allies — Russia and China — showed little signs of support even as Trump targeted Venezuela. Maduro could be forgiven for wondering who his true friends are as years of support by both countries for Venezuela’s socialist-led government politically, financially and militarily, beginning under former President Hugo Chávez, Maduro’s mentor and predecessor, appeared to have paled into nothingness when Maduro thought he needed help most.
According to experts’ reckoning, that backing now seems to be largely symbolic, with statements being given in support rather than concrete military or financial aid. In desperation, shortly before he was overthrown and captured, Maduro had turned to Iran, in addition to Russia, China for military aid — from drone technology to missile support — amid US military buildup. Just as China and Russia could not help Venezuela at such a historic and critical moment, strategic geopolitical and economic consideration would not have allowed them to stand by Iran.
While China, the world’s second-largest economy, has been bankrolling Venezuela, it did not actually guarantee unconditional military support. Beijing has loaned Venezuela more than $106 billion since 2000, to which — in return — Venezuela has sent “all the oil that China needs for its growth and consolidation as a power,” as Maduro’s predecessor Hugo Chavez once put it. Venezuela has fulfilled its end of the bargain. By late 2025, roughly 80 percent of its oil exports went to China – about 746,000 barrels per day.
The snag is the inflated perception of China’s power, actively reinforced at the highest levels of Venezuela’s political leadership. Over the past few years, Beijing has increasingly promoted its image as a global security actor and, as stated in a recent policy paper, it means to make security and military cooperation a priority of its future engagement with Latin American countries. The ties between China and Venezuela, elevated to the rank of “all-weather partnership” in 2024, seemed to have provided Maduro with an ultimately false sense of security.
In July 2024, while running for reelection as president, Maduro confidently spoke at a military parade in Caracas about the security benefits of his government’s partnership with China. Maduro asserted that his alliance with China provided him with “cutting-edge technology, in drone and anti-drone combat” and warned others “not to be mistaken about Venezuela.” But, few hours after Maduro praised Beijing’s leadership, calling President Xi Jinping a “big brother,” during the January 2, 2026 visit by Qiu Xiaoqi, China’s top envoy to Latin America, Maduro was arrested right in his bedroom and taken away by US Delta Force commandos.
The question of whether Latin America will rethink China ties has now arisen as Latin America may have now uncovered the limits of China’s security promise, following the decapitation strike on one of its closest partners in the region. Strictly and realistically, can Beijing still position itself as a credible security actor in the Western Hemisphere?
By now, observers would have noticed that resource governance is a critical factor in Venezuela and Iran, in addition to questions about leadership styles. While Maduro’s socialist regime kept a forceful and hard grip on Venezuela, Khamene’i unleashed repression and crackdown on non-conformists in Iran. Although Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, with approximately 303 billion to 304 billion barrels, accounting for roughly 18 percent of the global total, the economy is in shambles. The situation echoes past hyperinflationary crises, such as in Weimar Germany of the 1920s, Yugoslavia of 1990s, and Zimbabwe of late 2000s. The Venezuelan bolívar became so devalued, such that Venezuela became a country where, during periods of extreme hyperinflation — particularly from 2016 to 2018 — people and shopkeepers resorted to weighing currency rather than counting it. It became rampant that massive piles of bank notes were required to make simple, everyday purchases. To save time, cashiers and business owners used scales — something originally used for weighing cheese or produce — to determine the value of the cash piles, treating the money as a commodity rather than a currency.
As of early 2026, Iran holds approximately 11.8 percent to 12 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves, ranking as the third-largest holder globally behind Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. These vast reserves, totalling around 208 billion barrels, represent about 24 percent of the total oil reserves in the Middle East. Iran, under Khamene’i, has thus been filled with the ambition of becoming a nuclear superpower. Although talks were held on the limits to what Iran could or should aspire to, under the JCPOA Agreement, the Trump administration has been unequivocal about Iran dropping the nuclear programme altogether.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known as the Iran nuclear deal, is a 2015 international agreement between Iran and the USA, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany, along with the EU. It aimed to ensure Iran’s nuclear programme remains peaceful in exchange for lifting international sanctions. The agreement was aimed at limiting Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity and restricting its ability to develop nuclear weapons. Iran agreed to limit its nuclear programme (specifically uranium enrichment) and accept IAEA monitoring, but subsequently violated key commitments after the US withdrew in 2018, leading to the reimposition of sanctions on Iran. Since then, Iran has been suspected of double dealing as the country seems to have moved on with its nuclear research and enrichment while telling the world a different story.
In the buildup to the attacks unleashed on Iran the other weekend, Iran’s supreme leader rejected US calls for unconditional surrender. But, although it is too early to predict what could happen within Iran in the post-Khamenei era, defence and economic support from its two big trusted allies might not be forthcoming. The third ally, which fell just weeks earlier, is definitely nothing to reckon with in this present geopolitical and economic equation.
In Africa, the experiences of Maduro and Khamene’i should provide a lot of lessons for national political leaders and heads of government as to how to hedge their diplomatic bets. Those who have sold their countries to China on the altar of alternative and multipolar world doctrine would now have practical basis for a rethink. The US may not be providing the best of what most countries expect from Western allies, but rational thinking demands that the global political and economic reset should be acknowledged. This acknowledgement should shape policy choices and diplomatic relations. Although liberal intelligentsia and academics tend to push narratives around a growing China’s military, political and economic influence, the events between January 3 and February 28 also tend to have punctured their narratives. African countries trying to pivot towards China or Russia now may be doing a high risk bet as Iran and Venezuela might have learnt the hard way.
With the crash of Khamene’i’s regime, the control over strait of Hormuz by Iran may have been attenuated, while the activities of Houthi terrorists in Bab el-Mandeb strait at the Red Sea reduced. This should allow oil flow westward with minimal risks and may improve international maritime trade generally by lowering the price of oil and cost of sea transportation significantly.
For Nigeria, the signals from Iran and Venezuela are too big to ignore. These should keep Nigeria’s president awake all night. If those two countries can fall so easily, despite their heavily fortified leadership and military might, Nigeria can hardly pose any resistance, especially considering the last December 25 military action on terrorists in Sokoto State. It has long been reported that some terrorists have been providing security cover for illegal Chinese miners in exchange for money in Nigeria’s northwest for a while. Beyond just the northwest, precious metals of high values have been reportedly found in the north-central, northeastern and northwestern regions, enough to draw attention and commercial interest of external operators. It is doubtful if the US will ignore such an opportunity or leave it to bad actors to control. It will be a smart move for Nigeria to quickly realise this turn of events and adapt itself rather than keep aloof or attempt to pose any form of restriction, overtly or covertly.
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Dr. Olukayode Oyeleye, Business a.m.’s Editorial Advisor, who graduated in veterinary medicine from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, before establishing himself in science and public policy journalism and communication, also has a postgraduate diploma in public administration, and is a former special adviser to two former Nigerian ministers of agriculture. He specialises in development and policy issues in the areas of food, trade and competition, security, governance, environment and innovation, politics and emerging economies.
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