President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s decision to constitute the Presidential Committee on the Implementation of State Policing, last week, marks an important transition in Nigeria’s long-running debate on policing reform. Chaired by the President’s Chief of Staff, Femi Gbajabiamila, the Committee includes the Attorney-General of the Federation, Lateef Fagbemi (SAN), the Chairman of the Nigeria Governors’ Forum, Governor AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq, and representatives of the National Assembly, the Office of the National Security Adviser, the Nigeria Police Force and other key institutions. Its mandate is to develop the legal and operational framework for implementing state policing alongside the ongoing constitutional amendment process. This is a welcome development because it recognises an often-overlooked truth: constitutional amendments may establish institutions, but only sound institutional design makes them effective.
For more than two decades, Nigeria debated whether it should establish state police. That question has largely been settled by the country’s security realities. A federation of over 230 million people confronting terrorism, banditry, kidnapping and organised crime cannot indefinitely rely on a policing architecture designed for a far less complex society. Yet recognising the need for state police is only the first step. The more consequential challenge is designing institutions that improve security while strengthening democracy, protecting rights and earning public trust.
This initiative should also be viewed within its historical context. The recommendation for state police did not begin with the current administration. The 2014 National Conference advocated decentralised policing, while the APC Committee on True Federalism in 2018 reached a similar conclusion. More recently, the Nigeria Governors’ Forum has consistently argued that governors bear political responsibility for security without corresponding constitutional authority. The Tinubu administration is therefore not initiating a new conversation; it is translating years of national debate into institutional design.
The constitutional implications are profound. Sections 214–216 of the 1999 Constitution establish a single Nigeria Police Force under federal command. Altering that framework requires more than constitutional amendment. It demands complementary legislation, financing arrangements, operational protocols, intelligence-sharing mechanisms and credible oversight institutions. Nigeria is not merely creating another public agency; it is redesigning one of the state’s most important instruments of coercive authority.
Understanding this reform through the lens of Political Economy Analysis (PEA) reveals why it matters. State policing is not simply a response to insecurity; it is a redistribution of power within Nigeria’s federal system. It will reshape relationships between the Presidency and governors, between federal and state security institutions, and ultimately between the state and the citizen. Every stakeholder has legitimate interests. The Federal Government seeks national security and policy coherence; governors seek operational authority; security agencies seek institutional continuity; citizens seek safety without political intimidation. The task before the Presidential Committee is to reconcile these interests through governance arrangements that encourage professionalism, accountability and cooperation.
This is also why the Committee’s composition deserves careful reflection. While it appropriately brings together key constitutional and security institutions, one important constituency is absent: organised civil society. This is not a question of symbolic representation. It is a question of institutional legitimacy. Across the world, durable public institutions are increasingly designed through collaborative governance rather than exclusive state action. Governments possess constitutional authority, but they do not possess a monopoly of knowledge.
Nigeria’s civil society organisations have accumulated decades of experience in police reform, justice sector governance, human rights, community security and public accountability. Their practical knowledge should inform, not merely review, the design of state policing. Yet Nigeria’s reform history often follows a familiar pattern: the government prepares a draft, convenes stakeholder meetings and invites comments after fundamental decisions have already been made. Consultation has value, but it is not the same as participation. Contemporary governance increasingly embraces co-design, where governments and stakeholders jointly shape institutional choices from the outset. A reform that will redefine the exercise of coercive state power should be built on that principle.
The Federal Government should therefore consider establishing a State Police Co-Design Forum to work alongside the Presidential Committee throughout the reform process. Rather than functioning as another ceremonial stakeholder platform convened to endorse predetermined decisions, the Forum should serve as a structured institutional mechanism through which organised civil society, the Nigerian Bar Association, academia, traditional institutions, women’s organisations, youth representatives; organisations of persons with disabilities, faith-based organisations and the organised private sector contribute to the design of Nigeria’s emerging policing architecture. Their participation should extend beyond advocacy to practical policy development, drawing on years of experience in justice sector reform, community security, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and democratic accountability. Their collective expertise would enrich deliberations on civilian oversight, human rights safeguards, recruitment standards, professional ethics, fiscal sustainability, technology, complaints mechanisms and community engagement, the very issues that determine whether policing institutions command public trust or become instruments of political contestation.
Such a model would also reflect an important evolution in modern public governance. Increasingly, successful institutional reforms are no longer designed exclusively by governments and later presented to citizens for consultation. They are co-created through structured engagement with those who will ultimately live with the consequences of those reforms. This approach recognises that while governments possess constitutional authority, society possesses practical knowledge, lived experience and institutional memory. Bringing these perspectives together produces better public policy, reduces implementation risks and strengthens public ownership. For a reform as consequential as state policing, legitimacy should not be an afterthought; it should be deliberately built into the design process.
Comparative experience strongly supports this approach. Canada, Germany and Australia demonstrate that decentralised policing succeeds where local operational authority is matched by national standards, independent oversight and effective intergovernmental coordination. India’s experience illustrates that decentralisation without sufficient safeguards can expose policing institutions to political interference; while the United States reminds us that even mature federal systems must continually strengthen civilian oversight, transparency and accountability to maintain public confidence. The lesson from these federations is not that Nigeria should replicate any particular model. Rather, it is that constitutional decentralisation alone does not produce effective policing. The quality of institutional design, the strength of accountability mechanisms and the confidence of citizens ultimately determine whether decentralised policing succeeds or fails.
As the Presidential Committee begins its work, seven principles should guide its recommendations. The first is constitutional clarity, ensuring that the respective responsibilities of federal and state police institutions are clearly defined to minimise jurisdictional conflict. The second is subsidiarity, assigning policing responsibilities to the level of government closest to the people while preserving federal responsibility for national security. The third is professional independence, insulating operational policing from partisan political influence through merit-based appointments and independent Police Service Commissions. The fourth is civilian oversight and accountability, embedding independent complaints mechanisms, legislative scrutiny and transparent disciplinary systems into the institutional framework. The fifth is fiscal sustainability, recognising that effective policing depends on predictable funding, professional training and modern operational capacity. The sixth is human rights and inclusion, ensuring that constitutional rights, gender equality, disability inclusion and community participation become defining characteristics of state policing rather than secondary considerations. The seventh is cooperative federalism, establishing clear frameworks for intelligence sharing, joint operations and operational coordination between federal and state police institutions. Together, these principles provide a governance blueprint capable of producing policing institutions that are not only operationally effective but also democratically legitimate.
President Bola Ahmed Tinubu deserves credit for moving Nigeria’s conversation from constitutional rhetoric to institutional planning. Yet the ultimate success of this initiative will not be measured by how quickly constitutional amendments are secured or committee reports submitted. It will be measured by whether the institutions eventually created command the confidence of Nigerians across every region, political persuasion and social group. Public trust is not an incidental outcome of institutional reform; it is its most valuable asset. It cannot be legislated into existence after institutions have been established. It must be consciously designed into their governance architecture through transparency, accountability and meaningful public participation.
The debate over state police is therefore no longer simply about security. It is about the future character of Nigeria’s federal democracy and the relationship between the state and its citizens. The Presidential Committee now has a historic opportunity to demonstrate that democratic institutions are strongest when they are designed not only by the government, but with society. Expanding the implementation architecture to include organised civil society and other non-state actors would not diminish governmental authority; it would enhance the legitimacy, quality and public ownership of one of the most important governance reforms in Nigeria’s democratic history.
History rarely remembers committees for the reports they submit. It remembers them for the institutions they help to build. Constitutional amendment may provide the legal foundation for state police, but only inclusive institutional design will secure its democratic legitimacy. That is why state police cannot, and should not, be designed behind closed doors.
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John Onyeukwu, is a lawyer and public policy analyst with interdisciplinary expertise in law, governance, and institutional reform. He holds an LL.B (Hons) from Obafemi Awolowo University, an LL.M from the University of Lagos, and dual master’s degrees in Public Policy from the University of York and Central European University. He also earned a Mini-MBA. John has managed development projects on governance, public finance, civic engagement, and service delivery. He can be reached on john@apexlegal.com.ng
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