The most revealing aspect of the National Economic Council’s (NEC) newly endorsed 90-day economic action plan is not what it promises to achieve, but what it inadvertently acknowledges about Nigeria’s economic reform programme: that macroeconomic adjustments, however necessary or impressive on paper, cannot be considered successful while millions of citizens remain unable to afford the basic necessities of life. After more than three years of painful adjustments, the government is effectively conceding that economic reform must be judged not merely by fiscal indicators and investor confidence, but by improvements in household welfare. That recognition is welcome. But it also raises an uncomfortable question: if the government now accepts that citizens’ living conditions are the ultimate measure of reform success, what standard has it been applying since May 2023?
At its October 22 meeting, chaired by Vice President Kashim Shettima, NEC endorsed a 90-day action plan presented by Finance Minister Taiwo Oyedele. Its priorities include food affordability, tax harmonisation, completion of high impact projects, and resolution of investment bottlenecks and targeted household support. The Council also approved a national dashboard to track government projects and improve accountability for the utilisation of fuel subsidy savings. Shettima insisted that economic progress must translate into affordable transportation, improved healthcare, employment and greater financial security. These are sensible priorities. Indeed, they reflect arguments many of us have consistently advanced: economic reform is not an end in itself. Its legitimacy depends on whether it improves people’s lives.
The Tinubu administration inherited substantial structural economic problems. Petrol subsidies imposed significant fiscal costs, exchange rate distortions encouraged arbitrage, and longstanding weaknesses in productivity, infrastructure and public institutions constrained growth. Difficult adjustments were unavoidable. But recognising the necessity of reform does not absolve the government of responsibility for its sequencing, distributional consequences and implementation failures. Reforms inevitably create winners and losers, at least in the short term. Responsible governments anticipate these consequences and establish credible mechanisms to protect vulnerable households before imposing substantial adjustment costs. Social protection should be integral to reform design, not an emergency response to public frustration.
This distinction matters because economic reforms operate within political and institutional systems, not textbooks. Removing subsidies may improve fiscal space, but whether the resulting resources produce public value depends on budgetary choices, institutional incentives, procurement practices and accountability arrangements. Exchange-rate adjustments may correct distortions, but their consequences for import dependent production, food prices and household purchasing power cannot be wished away. The government’s responsibility is therefore not simply to announce technically defensible policies, but to build the institutions and compensating mechanisms necessary to make them economically productive and socially sustainable.
The contradiction between expanding government fiscal resources and persistent household hardship deserves particular scrutiny. Nigeria’s public debt stood at approximately ₦166.79 trillion at the end of June 2026, according to figures reported by the Debt Management Office. Meanwhile, monthly Federation Account Allocation Committee distributions have reached levels substantially above those prevailing before subsidy removal, although allocations fluctuate with revenue performance and statutory deductions. The reported ₦2.338 trillion distributed for August 2026 illustrates the considerable resources now flowing through the federation’s fiscal system. These developments do not establish that every additional naira represents subsidy savings, or that higher nominal revenues automatically translate into greater real spending capacity. They nevertheless strengthen the case for examining what governments are doing with the resources available to them.
This is the missing accountability conversation. Nigerians have repeatedly been told that subsidy removal would free resources for infrastructure, social investment and development priorities. Yet the relationship between increased public revenues and improvements in essential services remains insufficiently visible. Higher allocations have not consistently translated into demonstrably better public transportation, functional primary healthcare, reliable infrastructure or stronger social protection. The issue is not simply how much the government receives or spends, but what citizens obtain in return. A country cannot sustainably ask households to absorb rising economic costs while public institutions remain unable to demonstrate commensurate improvements in service delivery.
NEC’s proposed national dashboard could help close this accountability gap, but only if designed as a public finance instrument rather than a government publicity platform. It should disclose how subsidy-related fiscal gains are estimated, distinguish federal and subnational revenues, identify expenditure commitments, and connect spending to independently verifiable outcomes. Publishing project photographs, contract values and implementation percentages is insufficient. Citizens need to know whether completed roads reduce transportation costs, whether healthcare investments improve access, and whether publicly financed interventions actually reach their intended beneficiaries. Public expenditure is not itself evidence of public value.
A 90-day action plan can create urgency and strengthen implementation discipline. But a deadline is not a development strategy. What matters is what the government intends to deliver, who bears responsibility, how implementation will be financed and how results will be measured. Consider food affordability. Does NEC intend to reduce actual food prices, slow their rate of increase or improve household purchasing power? These are distinct objectives requiring different interventions. Food prices reflect agricultural productivity, insecurity, transportation costs, storage infrastructure, exchange-rate movements and market incentives. Without addressing these structural constraints, temporary interventions may produce limited or unsustainable relief.
The same concern applies to affordable transportation. NEC’s proposed joint financing framework for compressed natural gas and electric vehicles could reduce operating costs, but cheaper fuel does not automatically guarantee cheaper passenger fares. Transport operators respond to financing costs, maintenance expenses, route economics and market conditions. Without transparent arrangements linking public subsidies or financing support to measurable fare reductions, the benefits may be captured disproportionately by operators and intermediaries. Shettima was right to insist that success should be measured by affordability and accessibility rather than fleet size. The relevant question is not how many buses government commissions, but whether commuters can travel more cheaply, safely and reliably.
Finance Minister Oyedele’s reported ambition to bring headline inflation and interest rates into single digits by 2027 introduces another important accountability test. Ambition is necessary, but credibility requires a coherent explanation of the policy instruments, institutional coordination and economic assumptions underpinning such targets. Inflation is influenced by monetary conditions, fiscal policy, exchange-rate developments, supply constraints and expectations. Interest rates also reflect inflation expectations, liquidity conditions, sovereign borrowing requirements and financial-sector risks. Achieving simultaneous reductions therefore requires more than administrative optimism.
More fundamentally, declining inflation does not necessarily mean declining prices. It may simply mean prices are rising more slowly. For households already struggling with accumulated increases in food, transportation and other essential costs, this distinction is critical. The government must explain how macroeconomic stabilisation will restore purchasing power, improve real incomes and reduce the proportion of household expenditure consumed by basic necessities. Otherwise, Nigeria risks celebrating statistical improvements that remain disconnected from citizens’ lived economic realities.
NEC’s initiative also exposes a neglected dimension of Nigeria’s reform challenge: the political economy of federalism. While the federal government controls major macroeconomic policy instruments, state governments exercise substantial influence over agriculture, primary healthcare, rural infrastructure, basic education and local economic development. They also receive substantial federation allocations. Yet public debate often concentrates almost exclusively on the Presidency, allowing governors to escape equivalent scrutiny over their expenditure priorities and development outcomes.
This must change. Every governor endorsing the 90-day plan should publish state specific commitments, financing arrangements and measurable delivery targets. A governor who supports affordable transportation at NEC but fails to improve mobility within his state should not hide behind federal policy failures. Likewise, states receiving increased revenues while primary healthcare centres remain dysfunctional and rural communities lack access to markets must explain their priorities. Nigeria’s federalism should distribute responsibility, not excuses.Â
The political timing of the initiative also warrants scrutiny. The 90-day implementation period extends into January 2027, as Nigeria approaches another general election. This does not invalidate the programme. The government retains a responsibility to provide relief regardless of the electoral calendar. But the proximity of elections increases the importance of protecting publicly financed interventions from partisan capture. Nigeria’s experience demonstrates how discretionary distribution systems, weak beneficiary verification and opaque implementation arrangements can create opportunities for patronage, political favouritism and diversion.
Targeted household support must therefore operate through transparent eligibility criteria, verifiable beneficiary registers, auditable payment systems and accessible grievance mechanisms. Geographical distribution should reflect independently established needs rather than political calculations. Public resources must not become instruments for rewarding political loyalty or purchasing electoral goodwill. Genuine social protection strengthens citizens’ economic independence; patronage deepens dependence on political discretion. The distinction is fundamental to both development effectiveness and democratic accountability.
NEC should transform the 90-day plan into a publicly verifiable accountability contract. Within thirty days, the government should publish baselines, financing commitments, responsible institutions and specific performance indicators. At sixty days, it should disclose independently verifiable implementation progress, including expenditure and emerging household-level outcomes. At ninety days, it should present a comprehensive assessment open to scrutiny by citizens, civil society, journalists and legislative oversight institutions. Where targets are missed, responsible officials should explain why and identify corrective measures. Where interventions succeed, the government should institutionalise them rather than allow their benefits to disappear with the political cycle.
The larger issue is institutional credibility. Nigerians have repeatedly been asked to endure present sacrifices in anticipation of future prosperity. That appeal cannot remain indefinitely persuasive without demonstrable improvements in welfare. Nigeria does not suffer from a shortage of reform announcements. It suffers from persistent weaknesses in implementation discipline, institutional accountability and the conversion of public resources into public value. The latest NEC initiative offers an opportunity to confront these failures. But the burden of proof now rests with the government.
After more than three years of sacrifice, Nigerians should no longer be asked merely to believe that economic reform is working. They deserve to experience the evidence. And if meaningful improvements remain elusive after ninety days, the question will no longer be whether Nigerians have been sufficiently patient, but whether those entrusted with implementing the reforms have been sufficiently competent, accountable and responsive to the people they govern.
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John Onyeukwu, is a lawyer and public policy analyst with interdisciplinary expertise in law, governance, and institutional reform. He holds an LL.B (Hons) from Obafemi Awolowo University, an LL.M from the University of Lagos, and dual master’s degrees in Public Policy from the University of York and Central European University. He also earned a Mini-MBA. John has managed development projects on governance, public finance, civic engagement, and service delivery. He can be reached on john@apexlegal.com.ng
