The outcome of the 2026 United States midterm elections offers Nigeria an important democratic lesson as the country approaches its 2027 general elections. The Associated Press called Democratic victories in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, handing the opposition party control of Congress midway through President Donald Trump’s second term. Although some individual races were still being resolved, the political significance was already unmistakable: a governing party can control the executive, enjoy the advantages of incumbency and enter an election with substantial political and financial resources, yet still lose control of the legislature through the ballot.
This is more than a story about partisan fortunes in Washington. It is a demonstration of a fundamental democratic principle: elections are not instruments for renewing the mandate of the incumbent government by default. They are mechanisms through which citizens retain the power to reward, punish, replace or constrain those who govern them.
For Nigeria, where presidential and National Assembly elections are scheduled for January 16, 2027, the question is not simply whether the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) will be ready to conduct the polls. It is whether the institutions, political actors and public accountability mechanisms surrounding the electoral process will allow the votes cast to determine the outcome.
One of the most important features of the American midterm elections is the institutional separation between the presidency and Congress. The President does not administer the election, determine the outcome or exercise authority over the certification of congressional winners. The political party controlling the White House can lose its legislative majority without the constitutional order collapsing.
The electoral administration structure is also different from Nigeria’s. The United States does not operate through a single national electoral commission comparable to INEC. Election administration is highly decentralised: state laws establish the framework, while county and municipal authorities undertake much of the operational work. State officials, local election offices, trained poll workers and other institutions share responsibilities within a system of legal standards, oversight and accountability. The US Election Assistance Commission provides guidance and support but does not run elections.
This arrangement is not without weaknesses. Decentralisation can produce uneven capacity, inconsistent procedures and disputes. Nor should it be romanticised as a model that Nigeria can simply transplant. Nigeria has a different constitutional structure, political history, administrative geography and security environment. Its centralised electoral management framework places a much greater responsibility on INEC.
The relevant lesson, therefore, is not that Nigeria needs fewer institutions or a weaker electoral commission. It is that the credibility of elections depends on the ability of institutions to perform their respective functions without being subordinated to the political interests of those seeking power.
The test of democratic maturity is not whether an incumbent wins or loses. It is whether the rules and institutions make either outcome possible, credible and acceptable.
INEC has an enormous operational responsibility. Its chairman, Professor Joash Amupitan, reported in October that the Commission had completed nine of the 14 key activities on its revised timetable, with the national register of voters exceeding 103 million. The Commission also reported preparations involving 57,000 additional BVAS devices, election logistics, personnel recruitment and training, and the testing of its technology systems. On November 5, it reiterated that preparations were progressing, including work on cybersecurity, electronic result transmission and voter education.
These are important developments. But operational preparedness is not the same as institutional credibility. A commission can procure equipment, train personnel, publish a timetable and deploy materials on schedule without necessarily resolving the deeper political and institutional conditions that undermine electoral confidence.
There is also the question of funding. INEC has appealed for the timely release of outstanding funds required to complete its preparations. This is not a minor administrative concern. An electoral commission cannot be expected to guarantee operational independence and efficiency if its ability to discharge statutory responsibilities is exposed to avoidable funding delays or uncertainty.
More fundamentally, electoral integrity cannot be outsourced to INEC. Political parties must respect the rules. Security agencies must remain politically neutral. The judiciary must provide timely and impartial electoral justice. The media must report responsibly without becoming instruments of partisan manipulation. Civil society and election observers must be able to scrutinise the process, while citizens must be able to participate without intimidation or inducement. An election is only as credible as the institutional ecosystem that supports it.
The absence of a single, dominant national security or electoral authority visibly overseeing every stage of an American election should not be mistaken for the absence of security arrangements. The US system distributes responsibilities among local and state authorities, election administrators and law enforcement agencies.
Nigeria requires its own effective coordination, particularly given the realities of electoral violence, insecurity and the vulnerability of some communities. INEC works with security agencies through the Inter-Agency Consultative Committee on Election Security. That coordination is necessary. The more important question, however, is how security is exercised and held accountable.
Security deployment should protect voters, electoral officials, observers, candidates and election materials. It should deter violence, prevent disruption and preserve the freedom of citizens to exercise their franchise. It must not become an instrument for intimidating opposition supporters, restricting lawful political activity or influencing the conduct and outcome of elections.
The credibility of an election is not measured by the number of armed personnel deployed around polling units. It is measured by whether citizens can vote freely, officials can perform their duties without interference and the law is enforced impartially against all political actors.
Nigeria has invested significantly in electoral technology, particularly the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System and electronic result management. These tools can improve accreditation, reduce opportunities for certain forms of manipulation and strengthen the evidentiary basis for verifying results.
But technology is not a substitute for institutional integrity. BVAS cannot prevent every form of intimidation, vote buying or disruption. Electronic transmission cannot, on its own, guarantee that polling unit results are accurately recorded, uploaded, collated and reflected in the final declaration. Every stage must be transparent, auditable and governed by clear procedures that are consistently applied.
There is another emerging challenge. INEC has raised concerns about AI-generated misinformation, fabricated election results, voice cloning and deepfake videos. At a November 3 electoral information integrity summit, the European Union warned that the fight against digital manipulation must not become a pretext for censorship, suppression of political dissent or restrictions on independent journalism.
This is an important distinction. Electoral information integrity requires rapid verification, credible official communication, independent fact checking and accountability for deliberate manipulation. It also requires protecting citizens’ right to question institutions and journalists’ responsibility to report electoral failures.
The objective should be to strengthen public access to verifiable information, not to give public authorities unchecked power to decide which political opinions may circulate.
Perhaps the most difficult challenge facing Nigeria is not technological or logistical. It is political economy.
Elections take place within a distribution of power, resources and incentives. The value attached to political office, the influence of patronage networks, the monetisation of political competition and the advantages of incumbency all shape how political actors behave. Where access to public resources is closely associated with political power, the incentive to win elections can become stronger than the incentive to respect electoral rules.
This helps explain why electoral manipulation cannot be addressed only through voter education or the deployment of more sophisticated equipment. Vote buying, political intimidation, the capture of party structures, the misuse of public resources and selective enforcement of electoral laws are symptoms of deeper institutional weaknesses.
The question is whether political competition is sufficiently fair for voters to make meaningful choices and for opposition parties to organise, campaign and challenge those in power without facing institutional or coercive disadvantages.
The American midterms demonstrate that electoral competition can produce a change in legislative control even when the incumbent party retains the presidency. Nigeria must build the institutional conditions in which political competition is similarly meaningful, even if its constitutional arrangements and electoral system are different.
With the presidential and National Assembly elections scheduled for January 16, 2027, Nigeria has limited time to move from assurances of preparedness to demonstrable public confidence. INEC’s revised timetable also places the governorship and State Houses of Assembly elections on February 6, 2027.
Several tests should now command attention: Can INEC demonstrate that its technology, logistics, funding and result-management arrangements will work transparently across the country? Can security agencies provide protection without political interference? Can political parties compete on reasonably fair terms and accept lawful outcomes? Can the media and civil society scrutinise the process without intimidation? Can the judiciary resolve electoral disputes promptly and impartially?
These are not merely questions for election day. They concern the entire electoral cycle, from candidate selection and campaign finance to voter access, polling, collation, declaration and post-election justice.
The National Assembly also has a responsibility to ensure that the legal framework supports transparency, institutional independence and enforceable accountability. Electoral laws must not become instruments for protecting political advantage at the expense of democratic competition.
The American midterm experience is not a guarantee that Nigeria will reproduce the same outcome or that the US electoral system is beyond criticism. Its more enduring lesson is that democratic institutions must be strong enough to accommodate political defeat, constrain incumbency and protect the citizen’s right to choose.
A government may campaign for re-election. Its supporters may defend its record. Its opponents may challenge its policies and offer alternatives. But no government should confuse the authority to govern with ownership of the electoral process.
The election is not the government’s to win. It belongs to the citizens. The institutions established to protect their votes must be sufficiently independent, capable and accountable to ensure that the outcome reflects their freely expressed will.
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John Onyeukwu, is a lawyer and public policy analyst with interdisciplinary expertise in law, governance, and institutional reform. He holds an LL.B (Hons) from Obafemi Awolowo University, an LL.M from the University of Lagos, and dual master’s degrees in Public Policy from the University of York and Central European University. He also earned a Mini-MBA. John has managed development projects on governance, public finance, civic engagement, and service delivery. He can be reached on john@apexlegal.com.ng
The election is not the government’s to win